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INTRODUCTION
State collapse, humanitarian crisis, and war are the faces of Africa
that the world sees today. Lost in the tide of dark images are incremental
steps for the protection of human rights. In the most dysfunctional of
African countries, the skeletons of State institutions still stand. Some
judiciaries have even started to engage in a progressive and sophisticated
discussion of international human rights norms.
Member States of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) formal-
ized their rhetorical commitment to the promotion and protection of
human rights with the adoption of the African Charter of Human and
Peoples' Rights in 1981.' Since the Charter's signing, critics have dispar-
aged the African human rights system for its failure to establish a court
that would safeguard and enforce the rights guaranteed in the Charter.2 In
1994, the OAU began the process of establishing an African Court of
Human and Peoples' Rights.3 Given the lackluster performance of the
African Charter's primary guardian institution, the African Commission,
many commentators believed that the time had not yet come for the es-
tablishment of a court.
Misgivings aside, the OAU adopted the Draft Protocol to the African
Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Establishment of an Afri-
I. The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, opened for signature June 21,
1981, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3/Rev.5 (1981), reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 59 (1982) [hereinafter
African Charter].
2. With the entry into force of the African Charter came the establishment of the Afri-
can Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, a supranational body entrusted with
promotional and quasi-judicial functions to safeguard the Charter, but no court. See, e.g.,
George William Mugwanya, Realizing Universal Human Rights Norms Through Regional
Human Rights Mechanisms: Reinvigorating the African System, 10 IND. INT'L & COMP. L.
REV. 35 (1999).
3. See OAU Res. AHG/230 (XXX), quoted in Gino J. Naldi & Konstantinos Magliv-
eras, The Proposed African Court of Human and Peoples' Rights: Evaluation and
Comparison, 8 AFR. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 944, 945 (1996).
4. See, e.g., EVELYN A. ANKUMAH, THE AFRICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN AND PEO-
PLES' RIGHTS: PRACTICES AND PROCEDURES 193-97 (1996) (arguing that an African Human
Rights Court will face similar hurdles in establishing a useful role in the protection of human
rights as the African Commission); LONE LINDHOLT, QUESTIONING THE UNIVERSALITY OF
HUMAN RIGHTS: THE AFRICAN CHARTER ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES' RIGHTS IN BOTSWANA,
MALAWI, AND MOZAMBIQUE 74 (1997) (referring to the opinion of Professor Umozurike,
member of the African Commission, that a court should not be established because of the lack
of resources endemic in the African human rights system); Christof Heyns, The Regional and
Sub-Regional Protection of Human Rights in Africa: In Search of a Realistic Dream, 8 AFR.
SOC. INT'L & COMP. L. PROC. 170, 173-75 (1996). Heyns posits that although an independent
human rights court could benefit the protection of human rights in Africa, the current obstacles
of funding and the "need to first develop a human rights culture on the national level in Afri-
can countries" indicate that it would be wise to wait to establish such a court. Id. at 175.
[Vol. 24:103
African Courts, International Law
can Court on Human and Peoples' Rights in June 1998.' Since then, the
Draft Protocol and the proposed African Court have been the focus of
scrutiny by scholars of the African regional human rights system.6 The
proposed African Court has also captured the attention of international
law scholars analyzing the proliferation of international courts and the
effect of this phenomenon on international law,
Though the potential creation of a supranational human rights court
has brought international attention to the African human rights system,
international law and human rights scholars rarely turn to African exam-
ples when studying the domestic application of international human
rights norms.8 This Article seeks to fill that gap by analyzing cases from
several Anglophone common law countries in sub-Saharan Africa that
invoke international law and comparative case law as interpretive sup-
port in their national fundamental rights jurisprudence.
Part I of this Article develops the conceptual framework for the ex-
amination of these cases by outlining theories of national judicial
enforcement of human rights in Africa. First, it explores the technicalities
of the relationship between international law and municipal law and shows
how surprising the use of international sources is given their nonbinding
status in domestic legal systems. It then traces the trend toward human
rights constitutionalism through the post-independence creation of
5. Draft Protocol to the African Charter on Human Rights and Peoples' Rights on the
Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights, OAU Doc.
OAU/LEG/EXP/AFCHPR/PROT (III), reprinted in 9 AFR. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 953 (1997).
6. See, e.g., Yemi Akinseye-George, New Trends in African Human Rights Law: Pros-
pects of an African Court of Human Rights, 10 U. MIAMI INT'L & COMp. L. REV. 159
(2001/2002); Arthur E. Anthony, Beyond the Paper Tiger: The Challenge of a Human Rights
Court in Africa, 32 TEx. INT'L L.J. 511 (1997); Makau Mutua, The African Human Rights
Court: A Two Legged Stool?, 21 HUM. RTS. Q. 342 (1999); Naldi & Magliveras, supra note 3;
Andreas O'Shea, A Human Rights Court in an African Context, 26 COMMONWEALTH L. BULL.
1313 (2000); Nsongurua J. Udombana, Toward the African Court on Human and Peoples'
Rights: Better Late than Never, 3 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEv. L.J. 45 (2000).
7. See, e.g., Cesare Romano, The Proliferation of International Judicial Bodies: The
Pieces of the Puzzle, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 709, 720-23 (1999).
8. For example, recent compendiums which explore the role of domestic judiciaries in
enforcing human rights norms have not included any reference to the experience of African
courts. See, e.g., ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN DOMESTIC COURTS (Benedetto
Conforti & Francesco Francioni eds., 1997); INTERNATIONAL LAW DECISIONS IN NATIONAL
COURTS (Thomas M. Franck & Gregory H. Fox eds., 1996); JUDICIAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN
RIGHTS: MYTH OR REALITY? (Mark Gibney & Stanislaw Frankowski eds., 1999). A research
bibliography of "International Human Rights Law and the Domestic Legal Order" includes
references to the European and Latin American experiences but no African sources. See Jean-
Marie Henckaerts, Self-Executing Treaties and the Impact of International Law on National
Legal Systems: A Research Guide, 26 INT'L J. LEGAL INFO. 56 (1998). One study of the legal
effect of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in national law did include some citations
to several African cases examined in this Article. See Hurst Hannum, The Status of the Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights in National and International Law, 25 GA. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 287, 312, 377-97 (1996).
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justiciable bills of rights. This Part proceeds with an examination of the
debate between universalism and particularism of human rights in the Af-
rican context and concludes with an overview of the role and
responsibility of African judiciaries in enforcing human rights.
It is in this context that Part II examines selected cases from Bot-
swana, Namibia, Nigeria, South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia, and
Zimbabwe that invoke international law and comparative case law. The
cases discussed here were chosen because they highlight several distinct
modes of interpretation. Part II first examines how African courts invoke
international sources for support in adopting a broad policy of constitu-
tional interpretation. It then explores how courts have relied on
international sources in determining the substantive scope of fundamen-
tal rights, focusing on cases concerning corporal and capital punishment
under constitutional provisions guaranteeing the freedom from "inhuman
and degrading punishment." Part II concludes with a discussion of the
tensions between international norms, the exercise of judicial license,
and African traditions.
Researching African case law is a true challenge. Most African judi-
ciaries function on the scarcest of financial resources. In these
circumstances, compiling cases in law reports is the last priority. As
such, most national decisions in African countries remain unpublished,
and those that are printed in reporters are still difficult to access.9 Never-
theless some African States do publish quasi-regular law reports. '0 Most
of these regular reports are from Southern African countries or African
Commonwealth countries." Given the irregularity of the publication of
9. The jurisprudence of Anglophone common law countries is more widely accessible
than that of other African countries. This could be a result of Anglophone countries following
the common law system that values judicial precedent, as opposed to Francophone civil law
systems that rely primarily on codes and statutes. Particular countries in southern Africa pub-
lish regular law reports.
10. Some of these State law reports are financed by donations from international donor
organizations. In addition to State-sponsored law reports, several non-profit organizations or
private publishers have published books or reporters that document jurisprudence from Afri-
can countries. A new publication seeks to catalogue the human rights developments in all the
countries on the African continent. These country reports include occasional references to
national human rights jurisprudence. But even in the short lifetime of this series, the publica-
tion of annual editions has been delayed. See generally I HUMAN RIGHTS LAW IN AFRICA
1996 (Christof Heyns ed., 1996); 2 HUMAN RIGHTS LAW IN AFRICA 1997 (Christof Heyns ed.,
1999); 3 HUMAN RIGHTS LAW IN AFRICA 1998 (Christof Heyns ed., 2001); 4 HUMAN RIGHTS
LAW IN AFRICA 1999 (Christof Heyns ed., 2002). In 1998, the Nigerian Law Publications Ltd.
published its inaugural volume of the Human Rights Law Reports of Africa (HUM. RTS. L.
REP. AFR.), which compiled and reprinted human rights jurisprudence in Nigerian courts. The
Nigerian decisions examined in this Article were taken from this reporter. However, this publi-
cation faces difficulties in its production and has only published its inaugural volume thus far.
1I. Additionally, the South African Law Reports reprints selected decisions of various
courts in South Africa, Namibia, and Zimbabwe.
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case law, any comprehensive search for African case law is unscientific
and incomplete. Consequently, the cases examined in Part II were se-
lected from a small subsection of national cases that were discovered
that draw on international and comparative law in their fundamental
rights jurisprudence. 2
This Article uses the shorthand "international sources" to refer to the
full range of international authorities that these African courts reference
in their decisions. These sources include international human rights in-
struments'3 and decisions of international tribunals. Additionally, the
courts rely on comparative jurisprudence, drawing authority from other
common law countries, particularly from members of the Common-
wealth.
By examining these judicial decisions this Article seeks to highlight
the potential of the African State, through the judiciary, to play a positive
role as an enforcer and protector of human rights at the national level.' 4 It
takes this position not with the naive belief that the judicial protection of
human rights can substitute for the grassroots development of a human
rights culture or the conscious self-restraint of other branches of gov-
ernment in complying with human rights obligations, but rather with the
view that the judiciaries can and do play a pivotal role in developing a
normative climate in which such developments can occur.
This Article, therefore, does not address how the political climate of
a country limits, even undermines, the role of judiciaries in African
States. Most sobering is the reality that many of the countries whose ju-
risprudence is examined in this Article do not respect the rule of law.
Their judiciaries are also not fully independent. Authoritarian
governments have intervened to overturn progressive court decisions on
12. Locating these varied sources required more than a little detective work. Some
secondary sources on human rights in Africa report on human rights jurisprudence in African
courts. These leads were subsequently tracked down in printed law reporters, additional sec-
ondary materials, or internet cites. It was more systematic, if labor-intensive, to scan page-by-
page the law reports available on the shelves of well-stocked international law libraries for
cases that reference international and comparative case law.
13. These include both binding and non-binding instruments such as the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, Dec. 10, 1948, G.A. Res. 217A(III) at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810
(1948) [hereinafter Universal Declaration]; the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 6 I.L.M. 368 [hereinafter ICCPR]; the Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S.
221 [hereinafter European Convention]; the Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 [hereinafter CEDAW]; and
the African Charter, supra note 1. The technical aspects of how these sources take force in the
domestic legal order will be explored in discussion infra Section I.A.
14. The vision is one of the progression that starts with States that protect human rights
to the idealized "human rights [S]tate" Makau wa Mutua, Hope and Despair for a New South
Africa: The Limits of Rights Discourse, 10 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 63, 70-71 (1997).
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human rights issues by fiat or have reigned in the judiciaries when the
judges have been deemed to exercise too much independence.
The decisions examined in this Article illustrate how African courts
have used international law and comparative case law as interpretive
tools in their domestic rights jurisprudence. Even within the context of
repressive regimes and dysfunctional States, and despite the challenges
to the legitimacy of human rights in the African context, there exists the
potential for the indigenous judicial acceptance of international human
rights norms that can contribute to the expansion of a global human
rights jurisprudence.
I. THEORIES OF NATIONAL JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT OF
HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE AFRICAN CONTEXT
A. The Status of International Human Rights Law in National Courts
According to international law principles, international human rights
instruments do not automatically confer justiciable rights in national
courts. Before turning in Part II to a discussion of how African courts
have used international law to adjudicate fundamental rights claims
brought by nationals, this Section provides a brief overview of the rela-
tionship between international law and municipal law. African courts
draw upon international law and comparative jurisprudence, but not in
ways that traditional international law scholarship would expect.
Two alternative theories define the relationship between municipal
law and international law. 6 According to the monist theory, international
15. For two examples of how Zimbabwe reversed the effects of progressive human
rights court decisions through constitutional amendment, see 2 HUMAN RIGHTS LAW IN AF-
RICA 1997, supra note 10, at 317, and infra note 286. The Tanzanian Parliament has also
enacted legislation to complicate the procedures for bringing rights claims in court. See 2
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW IN AFRICA 1997, supra note 10, at 285. But see the example of Bot-
swana, in which the Parliament enacted legislation to codify a positive rights decision by the
court. See infra text accompanying note 279.
16. The theories of monism and dualism and the general relationship between interna-
tional law and municipal law are discussed in most treatises on international law. See, e.g., IAN
BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 31-33, 41-51 (5th ed. 1998). For a
comprehensive discussion of these theories see J.G. Stark, Monism and Dualism in the Theory
of International Law, 17 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 66 (1936). Scholars of international law and its
role in Africa have also commented on the monism and dualism theories. See JOHN DUGARD,
INTERNATIONAL LAW: A SOUTH AFRICAN PERSPECTIVE 36-57 (1994); TIJANYANA MALUWA,
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN POSTCOLONIAL AFRICA (Studies and Materials on the Settlement of
International Disputes, vol. 4, 1999); U. OJI UMOZURIKE, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL
LAW 29-36 (1993); Tijanyana Maluwa, The Incorporation of International Law and its Inter-
pretational Role in Municipal Legal Systems in Africa: An Explanatory Survey, 23 S. AFR.
Y.B. INT'L L. 45 (1998) [hereinafter Maluwa, Incorporation of International Law].
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law and municipal law comprise a single legal order within a national
legal system, with international law superior to national law.'7 In this sys-
tem, national courts must give effect to principles of international law
over superceding or conflicting rules of domestic law. Under the dualist
theory, international law and municipal law form two separate and inde-
pendent legal systems. International law prevails in regulating the
relations between sovereign States in the international system, whereas
municipal law takes precedence in governing national legal systems. Ac-
cording to the dualist theory, for a municipal legal system to give effect
to international law, national legislatures must incorporate international
law into domestic law, thereby creating justiciable rights suitable for en-
forcement by domestic courts.
International jurists also distinguish between the types and sources
of international law when speaking of international law's binding status
in domestic legal systems. International norms that have attained the
status of international customary law, for example, are considered to be
part of municipal law under both the monist and dualist theories, and
therefore prevail over national law even in domestic courts. Whether
norms and treaties of international law have reached such a status to be
automatically incorporated into municipal law remains a matter of de-
bate in practice. Moreover, insofar as international treaties and
conventions do not reflect norms of international customary law, the
status of international conventions and treaties in a national system de-
pends on whether a State follows the monist or dualist model.
African States inherited the international law frameworks of their
colonial powers. Most Francophone African countries that were under
French or Belgian colonial rule have adopted a monist view of
17. See UMOZURIKE, supra note 16, at 30. Umozurike notes that although the majority
of monists believe in the primacy of international law over municipal law, a small school of
"inverted monists" believe that municipal law takes precedence over international law. See id.
See also George Slyz, International Law in National Courts, in INTERNATIONAL LAW DECI-
SIONS IN NATIONAL COURTS, supra note 8, at 71,72 n. 11.
18. See UMOZURIKE, supra note 16, at 33. However, this is not the case in Britain. See
id. ("A British court will endeavor to apply municipal law in a manner that is compatible with
international customary law but if municipal law is clearly in conflict, it has no alternative but
to apply municipal law.").
19. To reach the status of customary international law, an international law principle
must meet the definition of article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, which
refers to "international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law." Statute of
the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 38(l), 59 Stat. 1055, T.S. No. 993, 3
Bevans 1179, [hereinafter ICJ Statute]. One African commentator has argued that only a few
provisions of international humanitarian law enshrined in the Geneva Conventions have at-
tained this customary law status to be automatically incorporated into municipal law. See
Michel-Cyr Djiena Wembou, Les normes internationales relatives aux droits de l'homme et
leur application dans la ligislation interne des Etats africains: problmes et perspectives, 11
AFR. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 51,52-53 (1999).
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international law, while Anglophone States of British colonial heritage
have embraced the dualist position.2" Of the national judiciaries exam-
ined in Part II, Nigeria, Tanzania, and Zambia are Anglophone, common
law countries that operate under the dualist theory. Botswana and Zim-
babwe are also former British colonies with common law legal systems
that follow the dualist tradition. Given their particular colonial experi-
ence, South Africa and Namibia follow the Roman-Dutch law model,
while also adopting an English common law approach to adjudication,
including its dualism.2
The effect of international law on a national system also hinges on
the properties of international instruments themselves. The Universal
Declaration of Human Rights is a hortatory declaration of principles and
aspirations and does not have the legal status of a treaty.2 2 The two Inter-
national Covenants, the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic and Social
Rights (ICESR), however, as well as the Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), are binding
treaties.23 The Universal Declaration, the ICCPR, and the ICESR com-
prise what is commonly referred to as the International Bill of Rights.
The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights is also binding
on its States Party. Under article 1 of the Charter parties must "recognize
the rights, duties and freedoms [of the] Charter and ... undertake to
adopt legislative or other measures to give effect to them., 25 This creates
a treaty obligation of domestic incorporation of the Charter for States
Party.26 The failure to do so constitutes a breach of the Charter.27 Article
20. See Wembou, supra note 19, at 57; see also P.E Gonidec, The Relationship of In-
ternational Law and National Law in Africa, 10 AFR. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 244, 245-46
(1998); P.F. Gonidec, Droit International et Droit Interne en Afrique, 8 AFR. J. INT'L & COMP.
L. 789, 794-95 (1996).
21. See ONKEMETSE TSHOSA, NATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
LAW: CASES OF BOTSWANA, NAMIBIA AND ZIMBABWE 17, 45-46 (2001).
22. See HENRY J. STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN
CONTEXT 151 (2d ed. 2000).
23. The binding effect of a treaty stems from the international law principle of pacta
sunt servanda, codified in article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties which
reads, "Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them
in good faith." Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969,
art. 26, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention]; see also BROWNLIE, supra note
16, at 620.
24. See STEINER &ALSTON, supra note 22, at 141.
25. African Charter, supra note 1, art. 1.
26. See U. OJI UMOZURIKE, THE AFRICAN CHARTER ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES' RIGHTS
110(1997).
27. It has been posited that during the drafting process of the Charter, the OAU States
were aware of the disparity between the effect of international law in monist and dualist States
and sought through article I to emphasize the character of the treaty as binding on States. See
LINDHOLT, supra note 4, at 85.
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62 further requires States Party "to submit every two years ... a report
on the legislative or other measures taken with a view to giving effect to
the rights and freedoms recognised and guaranteed by the present Char-
ter.' 28 The combined effect of articles 1 and 62 suggests that in light of
resistance to the signing and ratification of the International Covenants,
the drafters of the African Charter paid particular attention to ensuring
the binding force of the Charter in national legal systems. Of the dualist,
African common law countries, only Nigeria has enacted implementing
legislation to incorporate the African Charter of Human and Peoples'
29Rights into its municipal legal system.
Several African constitutions include specific provisions that define
the role of international law in the municipal legal order. Although Na-
mibia and Malawi have constitutions that have been described as
"international law friendly,"30 South Africa is best known for its constitu-
tional embrace of international law. The Interpretation Clauses3 of the
South African Constitution mandate that courts take international law
into consideration when interpreting the South African Bill of Rights,
28. African Charter, supra note 1, art. 62.
29. In 1983, the same year that Nigeria signed the African Charter, its National Assem-
bly passed the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (Ratification and Enforcement)
Decree, which forms chapter 10 of volume 1 of the Laws of the Federation of Nigeria. Given
that the President of the time was overthrown in a military coup, the Act was not approved to
take effect until October 1, 1990 with the provision that the effect of the Act would backdate
to 1983. See UMOZU.RIKE, supra note 26, at 1 11. One commentator notes, "[I]t is ironic, but
perhaps predictable, that the clearest illustration of the potential effect of the African Charter
in domestic law is found in Nigeria under a military regime at a time of severe repression
. ... " Frans Viljoen, Application of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights by
Domestic Courts in Africa, 43 J. AFR. L. 1, 7 (1999). Given the military decrees that have
suspended the effect of many domestic laws, the High and Supreme Courts of Nigeria have
faced the issue of whether ouster provisions affect the African Charter Ratification and En-
forcement Act. The High Court of Lagos has determined against the odds that this Act remains
untouched by ouster decrees. See Registered Trustees of the Constitutional Rights Project
(CRP) v. President of Nigeria (High Ct. 1993), reprinted in 4 J. HUM. RTS. L. & PRACTICE
218,248-49 (1994).
30. Maluwa, Incorporation of International Law, supra note 16, at 46.
31. See S. AFR. CONST. §§ 39(l), 233. Section 39(1) provides "[wihen interpreting the
Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum- . .. (b) must consider international law; and (c)
may consider foreign law." (emphasis added). Section 233 states that "every court must prefer
any reasonable interpretation of the legislation [under consideration] that is consistent with
international law over any alternative interpretation that is inconsistent with international law."
The formulations of these two constitutional provisions of the Final Constitution of 1996
broadened the scope of the courts' power to employ international law as interpretive guidance
when adjudicating domestic Bill of Rights provisions than was granted under the Interim
Constitution of 1994. See generally Andre Stemmet, The Influence of the Recent Constitu-
tional Developments in South Africa on the Relationship Between International Law and
Municipal Law, 33 INT'L L. 47 (1999).
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resulting in the emergence of a body of human rights jurisprudence that
12has gained international prominence .
Most African constitutions do not provide such explicit approval of
the use of international sources for domestic jurisprudence. Under the
traditional dualist theory of incorporation, African judiciaries' use of in-
ternational law would thus be subject to general limitations under the
principles of the relationship between international law and municipal
law. Not surprisingly, African international law scholarship has largely
framed the question of the application of international law in domestic
courts according to this traditional model.33
As Part II illustrates, many African courts have overcome the techni-
cal obstacle that nonincorporation would normally impose through their
use of international human rights instruments as persuasive authority in
national court decisions. Indeed, many of the decisions examined in Part
II include explicit statements to this end. As the Chief Justice declared in
one Ghanaian case:
Ghana is a signatory to this African Charter and Member States
of the [OAU] and parties to the Charter are expected to recog-
nize the rights, duties and freedoms enshrined in the Charter and
to undertake to adopt legislative and other measures to give ef-
fect to the rights and duties. I do not think the fact that Ghana
has not passed specific legislation to give effect to the Charter
means that the Charter cannot be relied upon.
This manner of incorporation may be better understood under an al-
ternative model of how domestic courts use international law, namely the
transjudicial model." The transjudicial model accounts for the actual use
32. Much scholarly attention has been paid to South African rights jurisprudence. This
Article minimizes its discussion of this body of South African jurisprudence, only incorporat-
ing discussions of cases that fit within the realm of the methodologies analyzed in Part II. For
a general survey of the use of international law in South African jurisprudence see generally
Richard Cameron Blake, The World's Law in One Country: The South African Constitutional
Court's Use of Public International Law, 115 S. AFR. L.J. 668 (1999); Brice Dickson, Protect-
ing Human Rights Through a Constitutional Court: The Case of South Africa, 66 FORDHAM L.
REV. 531 (1997); Jeremy Sarkin, The Drafting of South Africa's Final Constitution from a
Human-Rights Perspective, 47 AM. J. COMP. L. 67 (1999); Jeremy Sarkin, The Development of
a Human Rights Culture in South Africa, 20 HUM. RTS. Q. 628 (1998); Hoyt Webb, The Con-
stitutional Court of South Africa: Rights Interpretation and Comparative Constitutional Law,
I U. PA. J. CONST. L. 205 (1998).
33. This is evidenced by the African sources used to explore the traditional model of
the status of international law in domestic courts in this Section. See supra notes 16-32.
34. See New Patriotic Party v. Inspector-Gen. of Police, Accra (Archer, C.J., concur-
ring) (Ghana 1993), quoted in Viljoen, supra note 29, at 5 and 2 HUMAN RIGHTS LAW IN
AFRICA 1997, supra note 10, at 175.
35. The founding proponent of the transjudicial model is Anne-Marie Slaughter. See
Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Typology of Transjudicial Communication, 29 U. RICH. L. REV. 99
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of international law and comparative case law in domestic courts, regard-
less of the binding or nonbinding status of their sources. This results in
the cross-fertilization of international law and comparative case law in
domestic courts in continents around the globe.36 It evidences the dawn
of an era of "judicial dialogue"37 and "judicial comity.""
B. African Human Rights Constitutionalism
Unable to rely on international human rights instruments in national
courts, does an individual victim of a human rights violation in Africa
have other recourse? This Section highlights the institutional innovations
that postcolonial African States have used to lay the framework for the
judicial protection of human rights in these countries.
Many Anglophone common law countries in Africa adopted consti-
tutions, either at independence or through later amendment, that contain
bills of rights inspired by international human rights instruments. The
rights enshrined in these instruments are at the heart of the cases exam-
ined in Part II and provide the basis for the potential of human rights
constitutionalism in Africa.
"Constitutionalism" refers to a political order organized on the basis
of a constitution that forms the highest law." Although the term is a mal-
leable one, the literature on constitutionalism in Africa reflects a general
understanding of the concept of a constitutional structure that limits the
(1994) [hereinafter Slaughter, Transjudicial Communication]; Anne-Marie Slaughter, Judicial
Globalization, 40 VA. J. INT'L L. 1103 (2000) [hereinafter Slaughter, Judicial Globalization].
Karen Knop analyzes the challenges to international law scholarship on how to approach
studying the domestic application of international law. Her article debates the merits and lim-
its of the traditional versus transjudicial models. See Karen Knop, Here and There:
International Law in Domestic Courts, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 501 (2000); see also
Developments in the Law: International Criminal Law, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2049 (2001) ("The
International Judicial Dialogue: When Domestic Constitutional Courts Join the Conversa-
tion").
36. See Slaughter, Transjudicial Communication, supra note 35, at 117-18; Slaughter,
Judicial Globalization, supra note 35, at 1116-19 (specifying further the phenomenon of
"constitutional cross-fertilization").
37. Claire L'Heureux-Dubd, The Importance of Dialogue: Globalization and the Inter-
national Impact of the Rehnquist Court, 34 TULSA L.J. 15 (1998).
38. Slaughter, Judicial Globalization, supra note 35, at 1112-14 (emphasizing the
increased respect and deference between courts as judicial colleagues).
39. See Carla M. Zoethout & Piet J. Boon, Defining Constitutionalism and Democracy:
An Introduction, in CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AFRICA: A QUEST FOR AUTOCHTHONOUS PRINCI-
PLES 1, 5 (Carla M. Zoethout et al. eds., 1996) [hereinafter CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AFRICA];
see also Louis Henkin, Elements of Constitutionalism, in 60 THE REVIEW 11, 11-20 (Int'l
Comm'n of Jurists ed., 1998) (providing a comprehensive list of the elements of constitution-
alism: government according to the constitution, separation of powers, popular sovereignty
and democratic government, constitutional review, an independent judiciary, control over the
police, civilian control of the military, and individual rights).
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power and authority of government.4 ' A key element of constitutionalism
is the protection of individual rights and freedoms from governmental
encroachment.4 ' Bills of rights are drafted to serve this end. Entrusting
national judiciaries with the duties of guaranteeing these rights and hold-
ing the other branches of government accountable further provides the
foundation for human rights constitutionalism.
The creation of national institutional structures for the protection of
rights in Africa, however, has not resulted in the respect for them.4 '2 Ac-
cording to one commentator, the experience of constitutionalism in
Africa presents a paradox. "The paradox lies in the simultaneous exis-
tence of what appears to be a clear commitment by African political
elites to the idea of the constitution and an equally emphatic rejection of
the classical or at any rate liberal democratic notion of constitutional-
ism.' ' 41 Other commentators, drawing upon this paradox and evaluating
the status of and prospects for constitutionalism in Africa, have observed
that while African elites acknowledge the necessary limiting role of con-
stitutions, they often fail to respect their inviolability by changing and
amending them at their will.
44
Furthermore, the lack of autochthonous principles in African consti-
tutions presents an obstacle for their societal legitimacy.45 Some argue
that because of the inherited nature of constitutionalism in postcolonial
Africa, resistance to constitutionalism is not only inevitable, but also
indispensable to the internalization of viable mechanisms for constrain-
ing power.4'6 Although the legal structures of these countries are a legacy
of their colonial experience, enforcing human rights through national
40. See H.W.O. Okoth-Ogendo, Constitutions without Constitutionalism: Reflections on
an African Political Paradox, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY: TRANSITIONS IN THE
CONTEMPORARY WORLD 65, 66-67 (Douglas Greenberg et al. eds., 1993).
41. See Zoethout & Boon, supra note 39, at 6.
42. See, e.g., A.O. Adede, Constitutionalism, Culture and Tradition: African Experi-
ences on the Incorporation of Treaties into Domestic Law, 7 AFR. Y.B. OF INT'L LAW 239,
243-44 (1999) (citing eight deficiencies in African constitutionalism, including the lack of
independence of judiciaries).
43. Okoth-Ogendo, supra note 40, at 66. Okoth-Ogendo also notes that the failure of
constitutionalism in Africa has resulted in a dilemma for scholars, which he dismisses as in-
consequential or even false, to decide "whether to abandon the study of constitutions
altogether on the grounds that no body of constitutional law or principles of constitutionalism
appears to be developing in Africa, and might well fail to do so . I..." d  Okoth-Ogendo has
elsewhere commented, power elites have accepted "the need for constitutions only in the
minimalist sense of constitutive instruments, not in the maximalist sense as bodies of norms
governing the legitimacy, exercise, and distribution of [S]tate power." H.W.O. Okoth-Ogendo,
Human and Peoples' Rights': What Point is Africa Trying to Make?, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND
GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA 74, 84 (Ronald Cohen et al. eds., 1993) [hereinafter Okoth-Ogendo,
Human and Peoples'Rights].
44. Zoethout & Boon, supra note 39, at 11.
45. See id.
46. Okoth-Ogendo, supra note 40, at 80.
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judiciaries is a move toward more entrenched human rights constitution-
alism.
This Article assumes that the source of authority for the emerging
human rights jurisprudence lies in the institutionalization of human
rights constitutionalism. This term stresses the primacy of rights in the
constitutional structure and the judiciary's potential role in fighting the
paradox of constitutionalism in Africa through its institutional enforce-
ment of the respect for constitutional rights. Properly functioning
judiciaries that enforce the bills of rights that codify international human
rights norms articulate these norms through a national voice that may be
accepted as more legitimate. Given the heavy influence of international
human rights instruments on the drafting of bills of rights in African
countries," when a litigant brings a claim under these provisions and a
court enforces them, they are in effect nationalizing international human
rights norms.
Former British colonies in Africa underwent a unique independence
process. Given that the United Kingdom had neither a constitution of its
own nor a written bill of rights, the process of drafting postcolonial con-
stitutions was not a matter of transplanting the British model. The
political structures of the newly independent States reflected the British
imprint nonetheless. Though this included establishing a Westminster
system of government, characterized primarily by a parliamentary sys-• 41
tem with a strong executive, most African States have since departed
from the original British model by process of constitutional amendment
or by force. 9
47. The influence of international instruments on African bills of rights is generally
accepted. See Franck Moderne, Human Rights and Postcolonial Constitutions in Sub-Saharan
Africa, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND RIGHTS: THE INFLUENCE OF THE UNITED STATES CON-
STITUTION ABROAD 315, 324 (Louis Henkin ed., 1990).
48. See William Dale, The Making and Remaking of Commonwealth Constitutions, 42
INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 67, 72-73 (1993). Dale lists the principles which constitute the funda-
mental elements of the Westminster system: at least one cameral elected legislature; a plural
party system; executive power exercised largely by a prime minister and a cabinet chosen
from the majority party in the elected chamber; a recognized opposition; and constitutional
conventions. See id. "From Ghana in 1957 to Zimbabwe in 1982 the format adopted in consti-
tution-making in English speaking Africa was the same." H.W.O. Okoth-Ogendo,
Constitutionalism Without Constitutions: The Challenge of Reconstruction of the State in
Africa, in CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AFRICA, supra note 39, at 49 [hereinafter Okoth-Ogendo,
Challenge of Reconstruction].
49. Ghana was the first country to change its constitution in order to establish a one-
party State and subsequent military coups, such as in Ghana, Nigeria, and Uganda, further
resulted in the subversion if not the outright suspension of established constitutional rule. See
Dale, supra note 48, at 72, 77-78. According to Dale, "It is hardly likely that a form of par-
liamentary government, evolved through three centuries of political and social development by
an island on the fringe of Western Europe, could be successfully transplanted there." Id. at 80.
As Okoth-Ogendo phrased it, "the state in Africa at independence was not a constitutional
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Although the British required their colonies to adopt constitutions at
independence, they did not originally intend for independence constitu-
tions to include bills of rights.5° The first African country to consider
including a constitutional bill of rights was Nigeria.!' During that coun-
try's independence transition, a Minority Commission was appointed to
safeguard the interests of minority ethnic groups. Faced with the choice
of either federalizing the government structure or adopting constitutional
fundamental rights to guarantee equal treatment for minority groups, the
Commission opted for the latter. The resulting Nigerian Constitution
contained a bill of rights "which corresponded almost word for word
with the [European] Convention."52 The Nigerian experience served as
the precedent for subsequent African countries." The cases examined in
Part II come from countries that have included a bill of rights in their
constitution, either at independence like Nigeria, or through constitu-
tional amendment.
5 4
The European Convention had a particularly powerful impact on the
creation of these national rights instruments. There are several reasons
for this phenomenon. First, the rights elaborated in the European Con-
vention are more explicitly defined than those in the Universal
Declaration.5 Second, article 63(1) of the European Convention, popu-
larly known as the "Colonial Clause," allows "any state [to] ... declare
... that the present Convention shall extend to all or any of the territories
for whose international relations it is responsible. 56 This implied that a
State Party to the European Convention could choose whether to extend
the application of the Convention to its colonial territories. The United
state. Rather, it was a constituted state." Okoth-Ogendo, Challenge of Reconstruction, supra
note 48, at 53.
50. See Christof Heyns, African Human Rights Law and the European Convention, II
S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 252, 256 (1993). In fact, Heyns contends that Britain was "staunchly
opposed" to the inclusion of bills of rights in these independence constitutions. See id. In
particular, the independence constitution of Ghana, the first African country to gain independ-
ence from Britain in 1957, did not include a bill of rights and only made "cursory references
to one or two rights." Id.
51. See id. at 257.
52. Id.; see also PALAMAGAMBA JOHN KABUDI, HUMAN RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE IN
EAST AFRICA: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS OF THE
INDIVIDUAL IN TANZANIA, KENYA AND UGANDA 37 (1995).
53. Heyns, supra note 50, at 258 ("The Nigerian Bill of Rights can therefore be de-
scribed as the conduit for the importation of the Western articulation of the concept of human
rights into modem African human rights law.").
54. Tanzania, for example, though a one-party State, has amended its constitution to
include a bill of rights. See Chris Maina Peter, Five Years of the Bill of Rights in Tanzania:
Drawing a Balance-Sheet, 4 AFR. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 131 (1992). The Tanzanian Bill of
Rights, as well as the bills of rights of other East African countries also drew upon the lan-
guage of the European Convention. See KABUDI, supra note 52, at 38.
55. See Modeme, supra note 47, at 325.
56. European Convention, supra note 13, art. 63(1), 213 U.N.T.S. at 250.
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Kingdom did so in 1953, rendering the Convention applicable in its
colonies in Africa and elsewhere until their independence. 7
Although the European Convention had little practical effect in the
African colonies through article 63(1) under colonialism,58 it came to
play a significant role in the process of drafting independence constitu-
tions. The European Convention is credited with inspiring the bills of
rights of at least twenty-six Commonwealth countries, an influence of
unprecedented scale and geographic scope.59
The American conception of civil rights has also influenced African
human rights constitutionalism.60 African courts find parallels in U.S.
constitutional rights jurisprudence and use these cases as precedent. As
one commentator noted, "there is a vigorous overseas trade in the
[American] Bill of Rights, in international and constitutional litigation
involving norms derived from American constitutional law.' 6' Although
this commentator's article examined human rights jurisprudence in the
common law countries of India and the Caribbean, it failed to note the
emergence of such jurisprudence from common law African countries.
As Part II demonstrates, the overseas trade extends to and continues in
the African continent.
C. Universal or Particular Human Rights in African Courts?
Analyzing rights jurisprudence in national courts in Africa provides
a mechanism for testing the viability of the universal rights discourse in
Africa. The colonial influence on the creation of African State structures
has been blamed for the failure of constitutionalism in many African
States. Similarly, Western conceptions of human rights are contested as
culturally illegitimate in the African context. This Section provides an
overview of the universalism versus cultural relativism debate62 in order
to better evaluate the relevance of the use of international human rights
sources in African adjudication.
The academic and practical concern over the applicability and le-
gitimacy of international human rights norms in Africa raises two
questions when examining the domestic application of human rights
57. See Heyns, supra note 50, at 255.
58. See id. at 255-56.
59. See Anthony Lester, The Overseas Trade in the American Bill of Rights, 88 COLUM.
L. REV. 537, 541 (1988).
60. See Moderne, supra note 47, at 322.
61. Lester, supra note 59, at 541.
62. For a general discussion of the universalism/cultural relativism debate see JACK
DONNELLY, UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE (1989); Jack Donnelly,
Cultural Relativism and Human Rights, 6 HUM. RTS. Q. 400 (1986); Raimundo Pannickar, Is
the Notion of Human Rights a Western Concept?, 120 DIOGENES 75 (1982).
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norms. First, does the human rights jurisprudence in African courts sub-
stantiate or debunk the African particularists' claim that the
individualistic rights rhetoric of the International Bill of Rights is alien
to Africans? Second, have the efforts to Africanize human rights through
the creation of an African regional human rights system and the adoption
of the African Charter led individual litigants and domestic African
courts to rely more upon and give greater credibility to the rights defined
in their African articulation?
The experience of the national courts through the cases studied in
Part I indicates that thus far, litigants and national courts'in Africa have
embraced the universalist and internationalist discourse on human rights
with fewer cultural hesitations than the staunch proponents of African
particularism would predict. This is a striking phenomenon with implica-
tions for the future enforcement of human rights in Africa.
The main premise behind the critique of the applicability and legiti-
macy of international human rights norms in Africa lies in the historical
formulation of the current international norms by Western, namely Euro-
pean and North American, cultures. In particular, upholding human
dignity through individualized rights is criticized as a distinctive Western
conception.63 Relativists argue that Africans value their group and com-
munal identity more than their individuality,64 thereby rendering the
individualistic human rights rhetoric not only irrelevant to African con-
cerns but also of questionable cultural legitimacy." Although many of
the proponents of a culturally specific perspective on human rights in
Africa are Africans themselves,6 not all African critics of the human
rights rhetoric reject the universalist premise of human rights norms.67
63. See Virginia A. Leary, The Effect of Western Perspectives on International Human
Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA: CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES 15, 15-25 (Abdullahi
Ahmed An-Na'im & Francis M. Deng eds., 1990).
64. See Josiah A.M. Cobbah, African Values and the Human Rights Debate: An African
Perspective, 9 HUM. RTS. Q. 309 (1987). "[ln the same way that people in other cultures are
brought up to assert their independence from their community, the average African's world-
view is one that places the individual within his community." Id. at 323. See generally Rhoda
E. Howard, Group Versus Individual Identity in the African Debate on Human Rights, in HU-
MAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA: CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 63, at 159.
65. See Abdullahi Ahmed, Problems of Universal Cultural Legitimacy for Human
Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA: CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES , supra note 63, at
331, 332; see also Makau wa Mutua, The Banjul Charter and the African Cultural Finger-
print: An Evaluation of the Language of Duties, 35 VA. J. INT'L L. 339, 343 (1995).
66. For an overview of the prominent African proponents of a particular African per-
spective on human rights, see Mutua, supra note 65, at 352-54. See also Rhoda E. Howard,
Evaluating Human Rights in Africa: Some Problems of Implicit Comparisons, 6 HUM. RTS. Q.
160 (1984).
67. See, e.g., B. Obinna Okere, The Protection of Human Rights in Africa and the Afri-
can Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights: A Comparative Analysis with the European and
American Systems, 6 HUM. RTS. Q. 141 (1984).
[Vol. 24:103
African Courts, International Law
Several attempts have been made to reconcile the universalist dis-
course with a particularist African perspective on human rights. For
example, some scholars have located parallels in the underlying princi-
68ples of human rights norms in particular traditional African societies.
These efforts have sought to establish a "historically indigenous human
rights tradition ' 69 in Africa and have relied upon experiences from pre-
colonial African societies. 0 A critique of this approach points out the
tendency in this literature to generalize about Africans as if all Africans
of the continent share the same tradition and culture.7'
Other approaches have started from the premise that although pre-
colonial societies in Africa might have espoused traditions that uphold
respect for the notion of human dignity, these practices did not articulate
this respect in terms of our modern conception of rights." According to
this view, the important question to ask is whether African traditions
share values that are consistent with the underlying principles of human
rights norms so that they can lead to the promotion and observance of
human rights.73
Two themes of the peculiarity of concepts of human rights and dig-
nity in Africa emerge from the literature. First is the contention that
human rights are communalist rights based on the group-identity of Afri-
can societies.74 Second is the view that economic and social concerns in
68. See, e.g., Francis M. Deng, A Cultural Approach to Human Rights among the
Dinka, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA: CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 63, at 261;
Kwasi Wiredu, An Akan Perspective on Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA: CROSS-
CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 63, at 243.
69. Timothy Fernyhough, Human Rights and Pre-colonial Africa, in HUMAN RIGHTS
AND GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA, supra note 43, at 39, 39.
70. See Mutua, supra note 65, at 346-54.
71. See James Silk, Traditional Culture and the Prospect for Human Rights in Africa, in
HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA: CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 63, at 290, 323; see
also Heyns, supra note 4, at 171 (arguing that the success of the European human rights sys-
tem is due to the close cultural, historical, geographical, and economic ties between the
nations of Europe and that the African system cannot aspire to such success based on the di-
versity of traditions in Africa).
72. See RHODA E. HOWARD, HUMAN RIGHTS IN COMMONWEALTH AFRICA 17 (1986).
73. See Silk, supra note 71, at 315. Silk suggests:
The task is to look past these, almost as distractions, for a value that constitutes an
underlying, if latent, receptivity to the concept of universal human rights ... seek
some fundamental value or concept in traditional African society that, coexisting
with communalism, might constitute the necessary prerequisite for embracing the
basic human rights concept embodied in modem international norms.
Id. at 323.
74. See supra text accompanying note 64. "The combination of these ... related con-
cepts-the emphasis on collective or communal or group rights over individual rights and the
dependence of individual rights on ascribed status within a group-provides the core of the
uniquely African concept of human rights proclaimed by these authors." Silk, supra note 71, at
312.
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Africa prevail over civil and political rights, or first generation rights that
form the core of international human rights instruments. 75 Proponents of
these two positions sharply discredit the views of the other.76
These themes offer alternative frameworks for understanding the po-
sition of human rights in Africa. According to one perspective, the
colonial experience in Africa has left the continent struggling to reclaim
its voice and particular heritage. According to the other, African tradi-
tions espouse a framework for the respect of human dignity that lets the
continent aspire to the greater respect for human rights, even if it is
through their articulation as international norms. One author mediates
between the two camps:
[W]estern chauvinistic claims that human rights are inventions
of Europe and North America are hollow and ignorant; African
reactionary claims that human rights are "colonial and imperial-
ist" are also false ... the overall conclusion I draw is that the
demands for human rights and democracy in Africa today are
firmly rooted in the concrete experiences of the broad popul:tr
masses and are not ephemeral."
A concern for human rights and democracy motivates most who
theorize about the applicability and legitimacy of human rights in Africa.
Underlying both positions is a shared desire to find the best means for
promoting and protecting human dignity in Africa. Similarly, both posi-
tions recognize that the rejection of human rights as a purely Western
construct or the insistence on the particular African expression of human
rights are positions that can be manipulated to justify the disrespect of
human rights.78
75. See HOWARD, supra note 72, at 163; see also Rhoda E. Howard, The Full-Belly
Thesis: Should Economic Rights Take Priority over Civil and Political Rights? Evidence From
Sub-Saharan Africa, 5 HuM. RTS. Q. 467 (1985).
76. See Fernyhough, supra note 69 (providing a concise and insightful overview of
these two schools and how they interact with each other). For harsh critiques of the Howard
positions, see Cobbah, supra note 64, at 326; Mutua, supra note 65, at 354-58. Similarly,
Howard devotes considerable attention in her own work in responding to and countering the
indigenous Africanist positions. See HOWARD, supra note 72, at 11-27.
77. SHADRACK GUTTO, HUMAN AND PEOPLES' RIGHTS IN AFRICA: MYTHS, REALITIES
AND PROSPECTS 6 (1991). Also in an attempt to reconcile the two positions in view of focusing
on how to effectively enforce human rights, An-Na'im has claimed that "despite the inade-
quate concern with cultural legitimacy in formatting the current international standards of
human rights, it is advisable to work with these standards rather than to seek to repudiate and
replace them." An-Na'im, supra note 65, at 355.
78. See Lakshman Marasinghe, Traditional Conceptions of Human Rights in Africa, in
HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA 32, 32 (Claude E. Welch, Jr. & Ronald 1.
Meltzer eds., 1984); see also Mutua, supra note 65, at 380 ("Part of the reason for the failure
of the post-colonial [African] [Sitate to respect human rights lies in the seemingly alien char-
acter of that corpus."); Silk, supra note 71, at 291 (claiming that an African particularist's
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These combined interests, of promoting and ensuring the respect for
human rights and creating a culturally legitimate human rights regime in
Africa, prompted African States to negotiate, draft, and adopt the African
Charter of Human and Peoples' Rights in the context of the OAU. 9 Ac-
cording to the draft documents of the OAU, the authors of the Charter
drew upon "African wisdom" to seek out the "aspirations of the African
peoples" through a human rights instrument.0 Additionally, the drafters
commented, "We feel gratified.., about the originality of the text which
reflects the concerns expressed by one and all, in that the Charter must
reflect an African conception of Human Rights and Duties, in other
words the respect the African has for individuals and peoples. 8' Given
this particular heritage, the African Charter has been heralded as the
most inclusive international human rights instrument.82
The African Charter nonetheless embraces universal norms of inter-
national human rights instruments. For example, the Charter has "due
regard to the ... Universal Declaration of Human Rights."83 Further, the
drafters of the Charter felt it "prudent not to deviate much from the in-
ternational norms solemnly adopted in various universal instruments by
the different [M]ember [S]tates of the OAU. 84 Consequently, the rights
enshrined in articles 3-18 resemble those espoused in the International
Bill of Rights.
Despite its commitment to universal norms, the African Charter es-
pouses several distinguishing characteristics. The language of the
preamble to the African Charter reflects its unique African heritage and
"serves as a guide for the significant themes"85 that run throughout the
Charter and are reflected in the universalism versus particularism debate.
In light of its heritage, the Charter "[takes] into consideration the virtues
of [the] historical tradition [of African States] and the values of African
civilization which should inspire and characterize their reflection on the
riposte to human rights violations would be that "Africa cannot be held to standards that are
culturally inappropriate and that Africans had no part in establishing").
79. See Edward Kannyo, The Banjul Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights: Genesis
and Political Background, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA, supra note 78,
at 128.
80. OAU Doc. AHG/102/XVII, Nairobi, June 1981, at 22, quoted in N.S. REMBE, THE
SYSTEM OF HUMAN RIGHTS UNDER THE AFRICAN CHARTER ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES'
RIGHTS: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS 1 (1991).
81. OAU Doc.CM/I12/Pt. 1, Nairobi, June 1981, at 31, quoted in REMBE, supra note
80, at 1.
82. See GUTTO, supra note 77, at 8.
83. African Charter, supra note 1, pmbl., 21 I.L.M. at 59.
84. OAU Doc. CABILEG/67/3, rev. 1, at 2, quoted in Okere, supra note 67, at 152.
85. Richard Gittleman, The Banjul Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights: A Legal
Analysis, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA, supra note 78, at 152, 155.
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concept of human and peoples' rights. 86 The title of the instrument in-
cludes "peoples' rights" alongside human rights, thereby reflecting the
particular concern for the communalist tradition in African society. Al-
though the term "peoples" is never defined in the Charter, it is accepted
to evoke the group-based rather than individual notion of African soci-
ety.
8 7
The African communalist ideal is also expressed through the Char-
ter's recognition that "the enjoyment of rights and freedom also implies
the performance of duties on the part of everyone." The articulation of
individual duties" is widely accepted to be the African Charter's greatest
innovation in comparison to other international human rights instru-
ments," and a reflection of the alleged consensus in Africa that "the
consciousness of rights and correlative duties is ingrained in community
members from birth."90
Lastly, the preamble of the Charter addresses the African critique of
the primary focus of international human rights instruments on civil and
political rights.9' It states that "civil and political rights cannot be disso-
ciated from economic, social and cultural rights in their conception as
well as universality and that the satisfaction of economic, social and cul-
tural rights is a guarantee for the enjoyment of civil and political
rights." 2 It has been argued that the inclusion of duties in the African
Charter "is an excellent point of departure in the reconstruction of a new
ethos and the restoration of confidence in the continent's cultural iden-
tity.""
Though praised for its efforts to legitimize human rights in the Afri-
can context, critics contend that the African Charter's emphasis on
tradition creates a loophole for the protection of rights. 4 The example of
86. African Charter, supra note I, pmbl., 21 I.L.M. at 59.
87. See Richard N. Kiwanuka, Note, The Meaning of "People" in the African Charter
for Human and Peoples' Rights, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 80, 82 (1988).
88. See African Charter, supra note 1, arts. 27-29, 21 I.L.M. at 63.
89. See Mutua, supra note 65, at 364. Mutua however sees as precursors to the elabo-
rate articulation of duties in the African Charter, article 29 of the Universal Declaration which
states, "everyone has the duties to the community in which alone the free and full develop-
ment of his personality is possible," and the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of
Man. See id. at 364 n.90; see also Gittleman, supra note 85, at 154.
90. Mutua, supra note 65, at 362.
91. See supra text accompanying note 75.
92. African Charter, supra note 1, pmbl., 21 I.L.M. at 59.
93. Mutua, supra note 65, at 380 ("[The rights/duties conception] reintroduces values
that Africa needs most at this time: commitment, solidarity, respect, and responsibility.").
94. Some of the staunchest criticism of the Charter focuses on the inclusion of "claw-
back" clauses that are appended to particular rights, namely those elaborated in articles 8-14.
These articles articulate substantive fights, yet subject them somehow to limitations by an
undefined "law." According to one commentator, these clawback clauses "tend to be less pre-
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women's rights best illustrates this tension. Views diverge as to the Char-
ter's commitment to upholding the principle of equal treatment and
antidiscrimination toward women. The Charter's antidiscrimination, prin-
ciple is contained in article 18(3): "The State shall ensure the elimination
of every discrimination against women and also ensure the protection of
the rights of the woman and the child as stipulated in international decla-
rations and conventions."95 In itself, this provision can be read as an
unambiguous guarantee of the protection of women's rights.
Reading this antidiscrimination provision in conjunction with other
Charter provisions, however, gives cause for some misgivings.96 Article
17(3), for example, states that "the promotion and protection of morals
and traditional values recognized by the community shall be the duty of
the State."97 Additionally, the Clarter's "family provisions," such as arti-
cles 18, 27, and 29 place great value on upholding the traditional concept
of the African family. The language of these provisions, "seeks to en-
trench the oppressive family structure, complete with its exploitation and
marginalization of women in the public and the so-called private
spheres."98 Given the traditional, subjugated, role of women in certain
African societies, the Charter sanctions conflicting mandates without
providing any guidance as to which should prevail.
In sum, both the debate over the applicability and legitimacy of hu-
man rights norms in Africa and the meshing of universal norms with
African specificities in the African Charter leaves us with two questions
when examining the rights jurisprudence of domestic African courts.
First, is the resistance to the body of Western international human rights
norms reflected in any way in these courts' jurisprudence? As will be
seen in Part II, the answer to this question is no. The fact that individual
litigants are bringing claims to challenge violations of their human
rights, often their civil and political rights, shows that at least some
Africans are willing to embrace the individualistic articulation of their
rights and reclaim them in a court of law.
Second, the African specificity of the African Charter would lead
one to believe that litigants would prefer to claim the rights as articulated
in the African Charter than in other human rights instruments or com-
parative bills of rights. As one commentator phrased it, "[d]oes one
cise than derogation clauses because the restrictions they permit are almost totally discretion-
ary." Gittleman, supra note 85, at 158.
95. African Charter, supra note 1, art. 18(3), 21 I.L.M. at 62.
96. See REMBE, supra note 80, at 13.
97. African Charter, supra note 1, art. 17(3), 21 I.L.M. at 61.
98. Makau wa Mutua, The African Human Rights System in a Comparative Perspec-
tive: The Need for Urgent Reformulation, 5 LEGAL F. 31, 33 (1993).
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choose the 'universal' U.N. package or the 'specific' African package?" 9
Without the incorporation of the African Charter in domestic law, indi-
viduals cannot claim rights under the Charter directly in national
courts.1 °° The evidence from Part II suggests that parallels are drawn be-
tween rights enshrined in domestic bills of rights more with those of the
International Bill of Rights than of the African Charter.
D. The Role of African Judiciaries in Enforcing Human Rights
It may seem as if African courts face insurmountable obstacles in
developing a domestic human rights jurisprudence. Given the wide-
spread nonincorporation of international human rights law into national
legislation, the limitations on the status of international law in domestic
courts, and the precarious cultural balance between indigenous African
values and universal human rights norms, it is surprising that national
courts in Africa have interpreted the fundamental rights enshrined in
their postcolonial legal systems in light of international norms. This Sec-
tion explores the opportunities and importance of judicial activism in the
area of human rights in Africa and the role that lawyers and judges play
in bringing life to the rights guarantees enshrined in national constitu-
tions.
African judiciaries have been criticized for their complicit role in the
undermining of the rule of law in the post-independence experience in
Africa. As one African human rights lawyer observes:
[T]he judiciaries in Common Law African countries must take
substantial responsibility for the collapse of constitutional gov-
ernment .... the judiciary in many of these countries
deliberately and knowingly abdicated its constitutional role to
protect human rights and, in many cases, actively connived in
the subversion of constitutional rule and constitutional rights by
the executive arm of government. '10
Judiciaries stood by as constitutions were regarded as tantamount to
ordinary legislation, to be changed or ignored at the will of the execu-
tive. '°2 As autocratic rulers established single-party States throughout thecontinent, judiciaries were either totally co-opted and used as tools of the
99. Howard, supra note 66, at 165.
100. See discussion, supra, on the status of international law in national courts in Sec-
tion I.A.
101. Chidi Anselm Odinkalu, The Judiciary and the Legal Protection of Human Rights
in Common Law Africa: Allocating Responsibility for the Failure of Post-Independence Bills
of Rights, 8 AFR. Soc. INT'L & CoMP. L. PROC. 124, 124 (1996).
102. See id. at 130.
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executive, or proved incapable of maintaining their independence and
force as an institutional check on the governments.' 3 The presence of
white, expatriate, or English-trained judges on the courts of southern
African States was also considered by some to be a vestige of colonial-
ism, diminishing the judiciary's legitimacy as an indigenous postcolonial
institution.'°"
Recent trends among more independent- and liberal-minded judges
challenge this paradigm, empowering the judiciaries to assume a new
responsibility in the promotion and protection of human rights norms
enshrined in national constitutions.' °5 In a series of meetings sponsored
by the Secretariat of the Commonwealth of Nations, judges from a num-
ber of common law countries have gathered to discuss the topic of the
domestic application of international human rights norms. The first such
high level judicial colloquium met in Bangalore, Pakistan in 1988'06 and
resulted in the adoption of the Bangalore Principles,' 7 a statement of
these judges' commitment to infusing international human rights norms
in their domestic jurisprudence. The Principles recognize the nascent
trend "for national courts to have regard to these international norms for
the purpose of deciding cases where the domestic law-whether consti-
tutional, statute or common law-is uncertain or incomplete,"'0' and
declare that:
[i]t is within the proper nature of the judicial process and well-
established judicial functions for national courts to have regard to
international obligations which a country undertakes-whether or
not they have been incorporated into domestic law-for the
purpose of removing ambiguity or uncertainty from national
constitutions, legislation or common law. °9
103. See Isaak I. Dore, Constitutionalism and the Postcolonial State in Africa: A Rawl-
sian Approach, 41 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1301, 1307 (1997).
104. See Odinkalu, supra note 101, at 131. Furthermore, Odinkalu notes that certain
judiciaries "looked to the wrong sources for guidance" in interpreting their national constitu-
tions, such as the parliamentary system in England and to the jurisprudence of apartheid South
Africa. See id.
105. See id. Odinkalu's forecast remains hesitant as he does not underestimate the legacy
of the early, post-independence jurisprudence in the present day. See id.
106. See generally 1 DEVELOPING HUMAN RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE (Commonwealth
Secretariat ed., 1988).
107. See Bangalore Principles, I DEVELOPING HUMAN RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE, supra
note 106, at ix. The Bangalore Principles are also reprinted in 14 COMMONWEALTH L. BULL.
1196 (1988).
108. Bangalore Principles, 1 DEVELOPING HUMAN RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE, supra note
107, principle 4, at ix.
109. Id. principle 7, at ix.
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In sum, the Principles are a statement of understanding among
judges recognizing the extent of their power in interpreting laws in their
common law systems and the degree to which using this power in the
incorporation of international human rights in national jurisprudence will
advance human rights at the national level.
Although only one Justice from an African court attended this first
colloquium in Bangalore, subsequent colloquia have involved greater
participation from and a greater focus on Africa.'" In particular, the judi-
cial colloquia in Harare, Zimbabwe in 1989,"' in Banjul, The Gambia in
1990,"2 in Abuja, Nigeria in 199l1," ' at Balliol College at Oxford in the
United Kingdom in 1992, ' 4 and in Bloemfontein, South Africa
in 1993' ' were attended by numerous justices from common law African
110. The colloquia with lesser African participation included one held at Balliol College
in Oxford, England in 1992 and another in Georgetown, Guyana in 1996. See generally 5
DEVELOPING HUMAN RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE (Commonwealth Secretariat & Interights eds.,
1993); 7 DEVELOPING HUMAN RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE (Commonwealth Secretariat & In-
terights eds., 1998). Although several African justices attended the conference in England, the
colloquium in Guyana focused on Caribbean common law jurisprudence and only one justice
from Zimbabwe attended.
11I. See generally 2 DEVELOPING HUMAN RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE (Commonwealth
Secretariat ed., 1989). This meeting concluded with the Harare Declaration of Human Rights
which affirmed the Bangalore Principles and recognized that it is "essential to develop a cul-
ture of respect for internationally stated human rights norms which sees these norms applied
in the domestic laws of all nations and given full effect," as "[t]hey must not be seen as alien
to domestic law in national courts." Harare Declaration of Human Rights, principle 3, re-
printed in id. at 1I.
112. See generally 3 DEVELOPING HUMAN RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE (Commonwealth
Secretariat & Interights eds., 1990). This colloquium resulted in the Banjul Affirmation, which
affirmed the Bangalore Principles and Harare Declaration on Human Rights. See Banjul Af-
firmation, reprinted in id. at 1-4.
113. See generally 4 DEVELOPING HUMAN RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE (Commonwealth
Secretariat & Interights eds., 1992). This meeting culminated in the Abuja Confirmation. In
confirming the Bangalore Principles, it made a specific reference to "an impressive body of
case law which affords useful guidance to the national courts." Abuja Confirmation, principle
17(iii), reprinted in id. at 173-77. The justices present at the conference included the follow-
ing sources in this body of law: "the judgments and decisions of the European Court and
Commission of Human Rights, the judgments and advisory opinions of the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights, and decisions and general comments of the United Nations Human
Rights Committee." Id. Additional reference to comparative constitutional law, particularly
among Commonwealth countries, was made. See id.
114. See generally 5 DEVELOPING HUMAN RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 110. The
Balliol Statement adopted at this meeting highlighted for the first time the limitations of the
role of the judiciary in enforcing human rights and the danger of fundamental human rights
and freedoms present in societies as "paper aspirations" only. This Statement proclaimed,
"Judicial review and effective access to courts are indispensable, not only in normal times, but
also during periods of public emergency threatening the life of the nation. It is at such times
that fundamental human rights are most at risk and when courts must be especially vigilant in
their protection." Balliol Statement, principle 6, reprinted in id. at vii-viii.
115. See generally 6 DEVELOPING HUMAN RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE (Commonwealth
Secretariat & Interights eds., 1995). The Bloemfontein Statement was agreed upon at this
[Vol. 24:103
African Courts, International Law
countries, increasing these justices' awareness of the importance and
potential of applying international human rights norms in their domestic
courts. Furthermore, Part H illustrates that national African courts have
cited the Bangalore Principles and other statements from these judicial
colloquia as justification for their liberal use of international human
rights instruments and comparative jurisprudence in their domestic adju-
dication.
Following these Principles leads judges to reach outside of their ju-
risdiction for sources of inspiration and guidance to interpret
indeterminately worded constitutional or statutory provisions. Those
who believe in the true dualist tradition that separates international law
from municipal law, however, view the Bangalore Principles as "hereti-
cal.' 16
Nevertheless, it is apparent that the judges who attended these judi-
cial colloquia and signed on to the Bangalore Principles viewed
themselves primarily as activists whose goal is the greater protection of
human rights norms. "[I]n a democratic society which has a Constitution
... a Bill of Rights" and which has subscribed to international human
rights instruments, "judicial activism on the part of the judiciary is an
imperative, both for strengthening participatory democracy and for reali-
sation of basic human rights by large numbers of people in the
country."' 7
Justice Enoch Dumbutschena, a former Chief Justice of the Zim-
babwean Supreme Court and a frequent participant at these judicial
colloquia, also believed in the necessary link between judicial activism
and the promotion of human rights:
In order to advance human rights through the courts there are
two essentials to be met. The judge's personal philosophy must
have a bias in favour of fairness and justice. There must exist an
activist court. Judicial activism in human rights cases is a pre-
requisite for the development of a human rights jursprudence."'
He also recognized that judicial activism is a radical break from the
practices of the post-independence courts,"9 a change that was made in
meeting, which again confirmed the principles, statements, and declarations of the previous
judicial colloquia.
116. M. D. Kirby, The Impact of International Human Rights Norms-A "Law Undergo-
ing Evolution," 22 COMMONWEALTH L. BULL. 1181, 1184 (1996).
117. P. N. Bhagwati, The Role of the Judiciary in the Democratic Process: Balancing
Activism and Judicial Restraint, 18 COMMONWEALTH L. BULL. 1262, 1262 (1992).
118. Enoch Dumbutschena, Role of the Judge in Advancing Human Rights, 18 CoM-
MONWEALTH L. BULL. 1298, 1301 (1992).
119. Enoch Dumbutschena, Judicial Activism in the Quest for Justice and Equity, in THE
JUDICIARY IN AFRICA 185, 185 (Bola Abijola & Deon van Zyl eds., 1998) ("[T]hose of us
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favor of promoting social justice. Justice Dumbutschena's former col-
league on the Zimbabwean Supreme Court, Justice Gubbay, shared his
view. 120 The decisions emanating from these justices have contributed to
the Zimbabwean Supreme Court's reputation as an activist court, despite
the limits placed on its independence and effect by the repressive Mug-
abe regime.
Judicial activism is not without its critics. The most common com-
plaint is that the free license to stray from a national legal text leads to
judicial arbitrariness. A particularly harsh critic of the new South African
Constitutional Court's extensive use of international and comparative
sources called this methodology "rainbow jurisprudence,' 2' claiming
that "we have as much chance of finding genuine instruction about sub-
stantive reasoning in these wishy-washy pronouncements as we have of
touching a rainbow."'
2
Proponents of judicial activism counter such criticism. First, as long
as a judge's reasoning is transparent, that judge will be held accountable
and will not act arbitrarily. 23 Second, insofar as claims are raised under
national constitutions, it is still within the judges' powers to look beyond
the text to the values underlying the constitution.2 4 Furthermore, judicial
activism is tempered by the opportunity, need, inclination, and method-
ology of common law adjudication.'25 Despite these reasonable
arguments, a recent Zimbabwean case that dealt a blow to women's
rights 26 supports either the skeptics' position that broad judicial interpre-
tation can provide judges with the leeway to reach any desired result at
any end of the rights spectrum or the view that the failure to adopt an
activist position can result in the violation of an international human
rights norm.'27
[judges] from Africa tended to want to be technicians of the law. We wanted to be 'British or
French judges' in our own environment in Africa.").
120. See Anthony R. Gubbay, The Protection and Enforcement of Fundamental Human
Rights: The Zimbabwean Experience, 19 HuM. RTS. Q. 227, 227 ("[Jludiciaries should make a
greater conscious effort towards the protection and active enforcement of fundamental human
rights and freedoms, and should always endeavor, where possible, to construe domestic legis-
lation so that it conforms with the developing international jurisprudence of human rights.").
121. See Alfred Cockrell, Rainbow Jurisprudence, 12 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. I, 11 (1996).
122. Id.
123. See Bhagwati, supra note 117, at 1267.
124. See id.
125. See M.D. Kirby, Judicial Activism, 23 COMMONWEALTH L. BULL. 1224, 1232-34
(1997).
126. See discussion on Magaya v. Magaya, [1999] 3 LRC 35 (1999) (Zimb.) in Section
11.C. I, infra.
127. See Grace Patrick-Tumwine-Mukubwa, Ruled from the Grave: Challenging Anti-
quated Constitutional Doctrines and Values in Commonwealth Africa, in CONSTITUTIONALISM
IN AFRICA: CREATING OPPORTUNITIES, FACING CHALLENGES 287, 301 (J. Oloka-Onyango ed.,
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Not only do judges have an activist role in advancing human rights
in Africa, so too do the lawyers in national legal systems. Lawyers de-
termine when to raise claims under constitutional guarantees of
fundamental rights and have the ability to draw international and com-
parative law parallels in their briefs and arguments before the courts.
This encourages judges in the national court systems to take these
sources into account in their adjudication.'28
In fact, human rights nongovernmental organizations are developing
programs that encourage African civil rights lawyers to use international
law and comparative case law in the fundamental rights cases that they
argue before their national courts. These programs have emerged as a
direct result of African courts' invocation of international law and com-
parative case law in the cases examined in Part II. Some of the
organizations sponsoring such human rights lawyering programs are in-
ternational organizations with general international mandates that
include Africa.'29 Other organizations, however, focus on increasing hu-
man rights awareness and lawyering specifically in Africa. 30 The
activities of these organizations significantly contribute to the gradual
increase in the use of international law and comparative case law in fun-
damental rights cases in Africa.
The real challenge to national human rights lawyering lies in coun-
tries in which a legal infrastructure exists to enforce rights provisions yet
a repressive government is in power that would stifle and intimidate ef-
forts to enforce rights against the government before the courts. 3'
Despite these obstacles, much power rests with lawyers to ensure that
human rights provisions "do not simply become dead letters.' 32
2001) ("A court which is not activist can cause considerable injustice as happened in the Zim-
babwe case of Venia Magaya v. Nakayi Shonhiwa Magaya .... ).
128. See generally Anthony Lester, Preparing and Presenting a Human Rights Brief, 17
COMMONWEALTH L. BULL. 1055 (1991).
129. One such organization is the International Human Rights Law Group, which has
published a manual for practitioners on how to engage in human rights lawyering. See INTER-
NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW GROUP, PROMOTING JUSTICE: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO
STRATEGIC HUMAN RIGHTS LAWYERING (2001), available at http://www.hrlawgroup.org/
resources/content/PromotingJustice.pdf (last visited Nov. 24, 2002).
130. One such organization is called Africa Legal Aid. Africa Legal Aid maintains a
website that provides an overview of its activities and publications that promote human rights
lawyering in national courts in Africa. See generally http://www.afla.unimaas.nl/ (last visited
Nov. 24, 2002). Another international organization that is particularly active in advocating for
increased human rights lawyering in Africa is Interights. See generally http://
www.interights.org (last updated Oct. 29, 2002). Interight's website provides a database of
national jurisprudence on fundamental rights from African countries.
131. See Philip Nnaemaka-Agu, The Role of Lawyers in the Protection and Advancement
of Human Rights, 18 COMMONWEALTH L. BULL. 734, 736, 744 (1992).
132. Id. at 736.
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II. HUMAN RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE: A SURVEY OF THE MODES
OF APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE
SOURCES IN AFRICAN NATIONAL COURTS
Having surveyed theories of national judicial enforcement of human
rights in the African context, this Part examines the ways in which sev-
eral common law African courts have employed international sources in
their domestic jurisprudence in cases involving human rights norms. The
cases studied here come from the Courts of Appeal, High Courts, and
Supreme Courts of Botswana, Namibia, Nigeria, South Africa, Tanzania,
Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
This empirical analysis focuses on the methods in which the national
courts under consideration reference international sources in reaching
decisions under domestic law. The factual contexts of the cases are rele-
vant for the purposes of this examination insofar as they involve
instances of violations of a fundamental right guaranteed under domestic
law analogous to an international human rights norm. The parallels be-
tween fundamental rights guaranteed in national bills of rights and those
enshrined in international instruments have led national judges to look to
international human rights instruments and foreign jurisprudence to sup-
port their analyses of the scope of fundamental rights in their national
context.
In these cases, judges relied upon international and comparative
sources as an interpretive device in two manners. First, they used interna-
tional and comparative sources to support their court's adoption of a
particular approach to constitutional and statutory interpretation. Some
judges reflected on their role in defining the scope of rights embedded in a
national constitution, given the novelty of constitutional interpretation as
an exercise for them. For the most part, these judges adopted the purposive
approach to constitutional and statutory interpretation, '33 playing an activ-
ist role in broadening the scope of the indeterminate language that is
used to define fundamental rights. The judges did so consciously as part
of an effort to follow the emerging consensus or trends in guaranteeing
fundamental rights and join the ranks of judges of "civilized nations."'34
133. For a definition of what constitutes the purposive approach in these African justices'
eyes see the discussion in Section II.A infra.
134. Like the term "purposive approach," the Justices of the opinions examined in this
section refer loosely to the community of "civilized nations" that they seek to join. Despite
their failure to define this notion, the idea of a community of "civilized nations" prevails
throughout international law, as is evidenced in article 38(1)(c) of the Statute of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice, which lists "the general principles of law recognized by civilized
nations" as one of the sources of international law. ICJ Statute art. 38(1)(c). For the interpre-
tive purposes of the International Court of Justice, the "general principles" referred to in this
article guide that international tribunal to borrow and adapt general principles that are re-
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Second, these courts used international and comparative sources as
an interpretive tool to establish the substantive definition of particular
rights. Section B looks at several cases that examined the extent of the
notion of freedom from "inhuman or degrading punishment" in the con-
text of corporal punishment for crimes, and the constitutionality of
capital punishment and the death row phenomenon.
The national judges do not always embrace the universalist discourse
on human rights without reservations. The last Section examines pas-
sages from various cases that display an awareness of the tension
between the universalist and particularist views of human rights in Af-
rica. It first examines cases involving women's rights, an area in which
rights to equality often come into direct conflict with traditional rules of
customary law. It then explores language from other opinions that con-
veys cautionary attitudes toward adopting the universalist discourse.
What emerges from this Part is evidence that several common law
African courts have employed the discourse of international human
rights law to support their interpretive methodology and substantive de-
cisions within the scope of the authority granted them by their national
constitutions. Furthermore, these justices reference international sources,
which include the vertical sources of international human rights instru-
ments and horizontal sources of comparative jurisprudence from
domestic and international tribunals without any distinction as to
whether one type of source carries more sway than the other.
A. Source of Support for a Broad Policy of
Constitutional Interpretation
A prevalent theme throughout the cases studied in this Section is the
explicit reflection of African judiciaries on the nature of their role in
constitutional interpretation. These courts have turned to international
sources to find support for adopting a special approach to constitutional
interpretation. They invoked common law precedent from foreign courts,
in particular from Commonwealth countries, which share the same post-
independence bill of rights heritage. Courts have also cited the Banga-
lore Principles, which encourage the domestic application of
international human rights norms, as support for their methodology of
constitutional interpretation.
flected in the domestic law of "developed" legal systems. See BROWNLIE, supra note 16, at 16.
"Civilized" can be viewed, then, as synonymous with Western. For the African justices who
employ international sources as interpretive guidance in their jurisprudence, appealing to the
notion of joining the "civilized nations" is to adopt a progressive narrative toward the end of
greater human rights constitutionalism.
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One of the earliest decisions studied in this Section, the Botswanan
case of Petrus v. State'35 portrays the predominant approach of other
common law African countries to constitutional decision making. In that
case, Justice Aguda acknowledged the need to be transparent in his ap-
proach to interpreting the constitution. Noting the British influence on
Botswana's legal institutions, he considered how to differentiate consti-
tutional interpretation from statutory interpretation.'36 To support his
view that constitutional interpretation should be broader than statutory
interpretation, he cited to dicta from tum-of-the-twentieth-century deci-
sions in Australia and the United States. He also quoted a 1981 Nigerian
decision that declared:
The [Constitution]; that it is a written, organic instrument meant
to serve not only the present generation, but also several genera-
tions yet unborn ... that the function of the Constitution is to
establish a framework and principles of government, broad and
general in terms, intended to apply to the varying conditions
which the development of our several communities must in-
volve, ours being a plural, dynamic society, and therefore more
technical rules of interpretation of statutes are to some extent in-
admissible in a way so as to defeat the principles of government
enshrined in the Constitution. 137
In cases involving fundamental rights enshrined in a constitutional
bill of rights, courts have often adopted what is called a purposive ap-
proach. The Botswana Supreme Court in 1992 relied upon a Canadian
court decision to define the purposive approach: "Constitutional interpre-
tation should be purposive. Rights should be interpreted in accordance
with the general purpose of having rights, namely the protection of indi-
135. [1984] BLR 14 (Bots. Ct. App.).
136. "Given the British system of Government and the British judicial set-up, that was
understandable, it being remembered that whatever statutes that might have the look of consti-
tutional enactment in Britain, such statutes are nevertheless mere statutes like any others and
can be amended or repealed at the will of Parliament." Id. at 34.
137. Rafiu Rabiu v. State, (1981) 2 N.C.L.R. 293, 326 (Nig.), quoted in Petrus, [1984]
BLR at 34-35. The dissenter in a later Botswanan decision, however, also quoted this same
passage only to reject its premise as illegitimate. See Dow v. Attomey-Gen., (1992) 103 I.L.R.
128, 200 (Bots. Ct. App.). But a more recent Nigerian decision of the Court of Appeals, Lagos
Division, reflects a similar view of the constitution as a dynamic instrument and stresses the
role of the court in ensuring that the document thrive:
The Constitution is an organic document which must be treated as speaking from
time to time .... It is for the courts to fill the fundamental rights provisions with
contents such as would fulfil their purpose and infuse them with life. A narrow and
literal construction of the human rights provisions of our Constitution can only
make the constitution arid in the sphere of human rights.
Agbakoba v. Dir., State Sec. Serv. [19981 HUM. RTS. L. REP. AFR. 252, 282 (Nig. 1994).
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viduals and minorities against an overbearing collectivity."'38 Justice
Aguda read this passage to permit his court to combine a contextual
analysis with the purposive guidance of protecting fundamental rights.
Courts in Namibia 3 9 and Tanzania 40 have also adopted the purposive
approach to constitutional interpretation in their fundamental rights ju-
risprudence.
These passages from Commonwealth jurisprudence defining the
purposive approach to constitutional interpretation do not provide a sat-
isfactory explanation of the origins of this purposive approach. Given the
British origins of the Commonwealth legal systems that employ this ap-
proach, it may be that this form of constitutional interpretation derives
from the purposive approach to statutory construction in British law.'
4'
Commonwealth courts in countries with post-independence constitutions
have consequently sought to distinguish constitutional interpretation
from statutory construction, yet have grafted the purposive approach to
statutory construction into their methodologies of constitutional interpre-
tation in order to find the latitude to construe indeterminate
constitutional language. This purposive approach to constitutional inter-
pretation finds a parallel in the teleological approach to treaty
interpretation in international law.'
42
138. Dow, (1992) 103 I.L.R. at 201-02 (Wilson, J.).
139. See, e.g., Minister of Defence, Namib. v. Mwandinghi, (1991) 91 I.L.R. 341, 350
(Namib.) ("Although [article] 140 is not part of [chapter] 3 of the Constitution, [i.e.,] that part
which sets out the Fundamental Human Rights and Freedoms, the article concerns in particu-
lar the continuance, inter alia, of vested rights of individuals and should therefore be
interpreted in the same purposive and liberal manner for the preservation of such rights, as
would be the case with [chapter] 3."); Namibia v. Cultura 2000, (1993) 103 I.L.R. 104, 116
(Namib.) ("A constitution is an organic instrument. Although it is enacted in the form of a
statute it is sui generis. It must be interpreted broadly, liberally and purposively so as to avoid
the 'austerity of tabulated legalism' and so as to enable it to continue to play a creative and
dynamic role in the expression and the achievement of the ideals and aspirations of the nation
in the articulation of the values bonding its people and in disciplining its government.").
140. In Ephrahim v. Pastory, the Tanzanian High Court quotes Lord Denning's definition
of "the purposive approach of interpretation which is sometimes referred to as the schematic
and teleological method of interpretation," indicating its preference for such an interpretation
over a literal and grammatical interpretation of a statute. See Ephrahim v. Pastory, (1990) 87
I.L.R. 106, 114 (Tanz. High Ct.) (emphasis omitted). The Tanzanian High Court recognized
that this purposive approach was being applied by the Court of Appeal and approved of this
approach as it guaranteed the reinterpretation of rules under the new "grundnorm" that was
adopted when the Tanzanian Parliament adopted the Bill of Rights in 1984. See id. at 114-15.
141. For an explanation of the nature of purposive construction in the interpretation of
statutes by courts in the United Kingdom, see FRANCIS BENNION, STATUTORY INTERPRETA-
TION: A CODE 731-50 (3d ed. 1997). According to this canon of statutory construction, courts
"should aim to further every aspect of the legislative purpose [of an Act]. Construction which
promotes the remedy Parliament has provided to cure a particular mischief is now known as a
purposive construction." Id. at 731.
142. Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties directs that "[a] treaty
shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the
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Justice Aguda, of the Botswana Court of Appeal in Dow v. Attorney-
General, expressed his broad view of what a court does when adopting
the purposive approach to constitutional interpretation. "The construc-
tion can only be purposive when it reflects the deeper inspiration and
aspiration of the basic concepts which the Constitution must for ever
ensure, in our case the fundamental rights and freedoms. ... " He con-
tinued to describe how judges must approach interpreting the "living
constitution":
It cannot be allowed to be a lifeless museum piece; ... the
courts must continue to breathe life into it from time to time as
the occasion may arise .... I conceive it that the primary duty of
the judges is to make the Constitution grow and develop in order
to meet the just demands and aspirations of an ever developing
society which is part of the wider and larger human society gov-
erned by some acceptable concepts of human dignity.'"
The juxtaposition of these quotations reflects a recurring phenome-
non in the fundamental rights opinions, namely the invocation of a
variety of international sources without much concern or explanation of
the authoritative quality of these sources, used to the end of supporting a
mode of broad constitutional interpretation to give effect to a constitu-
tionally guaranteed fundamental right. In the example above, Justice
Aguda evoked both the purposive approach to constitutional interpreta-
tion and his vision of the constitution as a living document that
progresses with time.
The Zimbabwean Supreme Court has also espoused the vision of the
constitution as a living instrument that is subject to broad construction.
To support this position, that court cited Lord Wilberforce of the Privy
Council, the highest appellate court for several states of the Common-
wealth Caribbean,"15 in a case that originated in Bermuda:
terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose." Vienna Conven-
tion, supra note 23, art. 31(1), 1155 U.N.T.S. at 340 (emphasis added). Combined, articles 31
and 32 allow recourse not only to the text of treaties and conventions, but also to "supplemen-
tary means of interpretation" in order to ensure that the "object and purpose" of the treaties be
enforced. See id. arts. 31(1), 32, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 340.
143. Dow, (1992) 103 I.L.R. at 173 (Aguda, J., concurring).
144. Id. at 173. The metaphor of preventing a Constitution from turning into a "lifeless
museum piece" by "breathing life into it" has been used as support by the Zimbabwean Su-
preme Court in Rattigan v. Chief Immigration Officer, (1994) 103 I.L.R. 225, 228 (Zimb.).
145. The Privy Council is comprised of British judges of the House of Lords and sits in
London, yet it continues to serve as the highest appellate court for States of the Common-
wealth Caribbean and other former British colonies. See Laurence R. Heifer, Overlegalizing
Human Rights: International Relations Theory and the Commonwealth Caribbean Backlash
Against Human Rights Regimes, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1832, 1867 (2002). Heifer questions
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A constitution is a legal instrument giving rise, amongst other
things, to individual rights capable of enforcement in a court of
law. Respect must be paid to the language which has been used
and to the traditions and usages which have given meaning to
that language. It is quite consistent with this, and with the rec-
ognition that rules of interpretation may apply, to take as a point
of departure for the process of interpretation a recognition of the
character and origin of the instrument, and to be guided by the
principle of giving full recognition and effect to those
fundamental rights and freedoms with a statement of which the
Constitution commences.1
4 6
This case and Lord Wilberforce's opinion therein have been cited
frequently in the collection of cases from African common law countries
that interpret the scope of rights under their national bills of rights. Some
of the references to this case consist simply of a brief reference to the
general principles espoused by Lord Wilberforce. 4 7 Two cases, however,
have quoted a lengthier passage from the Lord Wilberforce opinion in
order to highlight the importance of giving life to a bill of rights while
engaging in constitutional interpretation:
Here, however, we are concerned with a Constitution .... It can
be seen that this instrument has certain special characteristics.
(1) It is ... drafted in a broad and ample style which lays down
principles of generality. (2) Chapter I is headed "Protection of
Fundamental Rights and Freedoms of the Individual". It is
whether the Privy Council can be viewed as a domestic court of the Commonwealth Carib-
bean given its colonial legacy. See id. at 1908-09.
146. Minister of Home Affairs, Berm. v. Fisher, quoted in Bull v. Minister of Home
Affairs, 1986 (1) ZLR 202, 210.
147. See, e.g., Petrus v. State, [1984] BLR 14, 30 (Bots. Ct. App.) (citing Lord Wilber-
force in the Minister of Home Affairs, Bermuda case for the proposition, "Botswana is a
member of a comity of civilised nations and the rights and freedoms of its citizens are en-
trenched in its Constitution, a constitution which is binding on the legislature."). In Catholic
Commission for Justice & Peace in Zimbabwe v. Attorney-General, the Court drew upon Lord
Wilberforce's position for support in overruling a Zimbabwean precedent. 1993 (1) ZLR 242,
258 (Zimb.). "[The Zimbabwean Precedent] preceded the adumbration by Lord Wilberforce
... of the liberal interpretative technique applicable to constitutional provisions relating to the
protection of the individual-an approach that has more than once received the commendation
of this court." Id. The Court made an additional reference to Lord Wilberforce when citing to a
minority opinion in a Jamaican death row case. See id. at 269-70 ("[I prefer the minority opin-
ion which] applied the liberal interpretation of fundamental rights recommended in Minister of
Home Affairs v. Fisher... and accords with the evolving standards in any civilised country.").
Finally, in State v. Makwanyane, the South African Constitutional Court also referred to the
Lord Wilberforce opinion for support on methodology of constitutional interpretation. 1995
(3) SALR 391 (CC). "[Section 11(2) of the Constitution] must be construed in a way which
secures for 'individuals the full measure' of its protection." Id. at 403-04.
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known that this chapter, as similar portions of other constitu-
tional instruments drafted in the postcolonial period, starting
with the Constitution of Nigeria, and including the Constitutions
of most Caribbean territories, was greatly influenced by the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms.... That Convention was signed and
ratified by the United Kingdom and applied to dependent territo-
ries including Bermuda. It was in turn influenced by the United
Nations' Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948. These
antecedents, and the form of [chapter] 1 itself, call for a gener-
ous interpretation, avoiding what has been called "the austerity
of tabulated legalism", suitable to give to individuals the full
measure of the fundamental rights and freedoms referred to [in
the Constitution]."8
The Namibian and Botswanan courts that quoted this passage re-
marked how the heritage and nature of their constitutions and bills of
rights resemble those of Bermuda as explained by Lord Wilberforce. In
doing so, these courts recognized the common universal heritage of their
bills of rights while gathering support for their chosen methodology of
looking to international sources for guidance in determining the scope of
fundamental rights enshrined in their constitutions.
Finally, several court decisions cited specifically to the Bangalore
Principles and other declarations that have emerged from the Common-
wealth judicial colloquia on the domestic application of international
human rights norms. 49 The courts used these principles to support their
project of incorporating international sources into their domestic funda-
mental rights jurisprudence. This was done despite the fact that such
declarations are simply expressions of informal agreement on principles
and not binding upon the courts or the States.
148. Minister of Home Affairs, Bermuda v. Fisher, [ 1980] A.C. 319, 328-29 (P.C. 1979),
quoted in Minister of Defence, Namib. v. Mwandinghi, (1991) 91 I.L.R. 341, 348 (Namib.),
Dow v. Attorney-Gen., (1992) 103 I.L.R. 128, 160 (Bots. Ct. App.) (citation omitted); see also
id. at 186 (Bizos, J., concurring) ("The Constitution of Botswana was enacted on 30 Septem-
ber 1966 in substantially similar circumstances as those mentioned by Lord
Wilberforce .... ). Lord Wilberforce's call to avoid "the austerity of tabulated legalism" has
been relied upon for support by the Namibian Supreme Court, without reference to this opin-
ion. Namibia v. Cultura 2000, (1993) 103 I.L.R. 104, 116 (Namib.). In doing so, it combines
this image with the purposive approach. "[The Constitution] must be interpreted broadly,
liberally and purposively so as to avoid the 'austerity of tabulated legalism' and so as to enable
it to continue to play a creative and dynamic role in the expression and the achievement of the
ideals and aspirations of the nation in the articulation of the values bonding its people and in
disciplining its government" Id.
149. See supra text accompanying notes 106-115.
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The way the authors of these opinions referred to the principles dis-
plays a respect for the enterprise of developing a human rights
jurisprudence and an eagerness to contribute to this task.' For example,
in Dow v. Attorney-General, Justice Aguda quoted passages of state-
ments made by two non-African Commonwealth justices at the
Bangalore colloquium that call for the greater domestic use of interna-
tional norms. He then commented, "I am prepared to accept and embrace
the views of these two great judges and hold them as the light to guide
my feet through the dark path to the ultimate construction of the provi-
sions of our Constitution now in dispute."'' Other courts referenced
these principles of the judicial colloquia as support for the legitimacy of
applying international human rights norms in their domestic jurispru-
dence.'52 Lastly, a Nigerian High Court decision cited to the Balliol
Statement of 1992' 53 for support in a case protecting fundamental
rights.
54
This Section has explored the modes in which common law African
judges have turned to comparative jurisprudence and general principles
of understanding to establish the propriety of the methodologies of
broad, purposive constitutional interpretation and the application of in-
ternational human rights norms in domestic adjudication. The following
Section examines how these methodologies have been used to develop a
substantive jurisprudence on the scope of certain fundamental rights.
150. But see Longwe v. Intercontinental Hotels, [1993] 4 LRC 221, 233 (Zambia 1992)
(comment on the domestic effect of international treaties and conventions). In that opinion,
Justice Musumali distinguished treaties such as the African Charter and CEDAW which have
been ratified by Zambia without reservations indicating "the willingness by that state to be
bound by the provisions of such a document" from the Bangalore Principles. Id. It was deter-
mined that "it is a misdirection in law to treat [the Bangalore Principles] as standing at par
with treaties and conventions entered into and ratified by the executive wing." Id.
151. Dow v. Attorney-Gen., (1992) 103 I.L.R. at 176 (Aguda, J., concurring).
152. See Mg'omongo v. Kwankwa & Attorney-Gen. (Tanz. 1992) (Mwalusanya, J.),
reprinted in 5 AFR. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 703, 706 (1993) (citing the Harare Declaration of
Human Rights and the Bangalore Principles as support for the assertion that "it is a general
principle of law that the interpretation of our provisions in the Constitution have to be made in
light of the jurisprudence which has developed on similar provisions in other international and
regional statements of the law").
153. See supra note 114.
154. See Punch Nig. Ltd. v. Attomey-Gen., (1994) 1 HUM. RTS. L. REP. AFR. 489, 508
(Nig.)(Odunowo, J.) (holding that a military decree in a time of a state of emergency did not
suspend the application of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights Ratification and
Enforcement Act, but rather necessitated heightened judicial scrutiny of any violations of
fundamental rights).
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B. Source of Support for Determining the Substantive Scope
of Fundamental and Human Rights Norms
1. Corporal Punishment as "torture, inhuman
or degrading punishment or treatment"
This Section focuses on how four courts in southern Africa have
ruled on the constitutionality of statutory provisions that provided for the
sentencing of corporal punishment for those convicted of crimes. These
cases struggled to determine the scope of the right to be free from "in-
human or degrading punishment." Although the exact wording of each
constitutional right varied from country to country, all of these courts
reached the same conclusion that corporal punishment infringed the fun-
damental rights of their citizens. In the first case, the court looked
beyond the boundaries of its country and continent to find support for its
substantive constitutional determination. Subsequent courts relied not
only upon similar international sources but also sought support from
neighboring African courts, which had similarly sought to define the
scope of fundamental rights provisions.
In Petrus v. State,'55 the Botswana Court of Appeal was asked to de-
termine the constitutionality of mandatory sentencing of corporal
punishment under section 305(1) of the Penal Code as prescribed in sec-
tion 301(3) of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act.'56 Section 7 of
the Constitution of Botswana guarantees protection from torture or "in-
human or degrading punishment or treatment."'17 The statute provided
for the following punishment: "four strokes each quarter in the first and
last years of his imprisonment ... administered in traditional manner
with traditional instrument."''58 The court determined that this punishment
constitutes the "repeated and delayed infliction of strokes."'59
155. [1984] BLR 14 (Bots. Ct. App.).
156. See id. at 18-19.
157. BOTS. CONST. ch. 11, § 7(l), quoted in Petrus, [1984] BLR at 18. Section 7 falls
under chapter II of the Botswana Constitution that is entitled "Protection of Fundamental
Rights and Freedoms of the Individual." The text of section 7 reads:
(1) No person shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading punishment
or other treatment.
(2) Nothing contained in or done under the authority of any law shall be held to
be inconsistent with or in contravention of this section to the extent that the
law in question authorizes the infliction of any description of punishment that
was lawful in the former Protectorate of Bechuanaland immediately before the
coming into operation of this Constitution.
BOTS. CONST. Ch. II, § 7.
158. Petrus, [ 1984] BLR at 25.
159. Id. at 29.
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In the court's opinion, President Maisels referred to a dictionary
definition of the word "inhuman" as "brutal, barbarous, cruel." '6° From
there, President Maisels, consciously exercised a "value judgment,' 6'
and held that the repeated and delayed punishment under the Criminal
Procedure Evidence Act met the standards of this definition of inhu-
man. 16 By nature, it constituted degrading punishment.
16
1
In reaching this decision President Maisels referenced international
sources that were raised by counsel before the court.' 64 These sources
include U.S. case law, a decision of the European Court of Human
Rights, 65 a German court decision, the text of the European Convention,
a dissenting judgment from a Jamaican case, and articles by Nigerian
and South African academics. 66 The opinion simply mentioned these
sources without providing a description or a comparison of the type of
corporal punishment at issue in those cases or the substantive rights con-
sidered by the national courts or international tribunals. It also did not
explore the reasoning the foreign courts or academics followed. None-
theless, President Maisels informed us in his opinion that the repeated
and delayed infliction of strokes at issue in this case "would be regarded
in the [foreign] countries where the [other] judgments were given and
the articles written, as inhuman or degrading."'
67
In a concurring opinion in Petrus, Justice Aguda struggled more with
the actual language of the fundamental right enshrined in section 7(1). In
doing so, he established that the text of section 7(l) prohibits a range of
actions: the infliction of torture, inhuman punishment, degrading pun-
ishment, inhuman treatment, and degrading treatment on any person.1
6 8
He then revealed that he was persuaded by the argument proffered by
counsel that "inhuman and degrading punishment" under the Botswana




163. See id. at 30.
164. See id. at 28-29.
165. The decision cited to is Tyrer v. United Kingdom, 26 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1978)
which is discussed in greater depth by other courts ruling on the constitutionality of corporal
punishment. See infra text accompanying notes 181-183.
166. See Petrus, [1984] BLR at 29. President Maisels introduces these paragraphs can-
vassing international sources by claiming, "I turn now to deal with the reasons for the court's
finding that corporal punishment as prescribed in [§] 301(3) ... is ultra vires and conse-
quently null and void as being in conflict with section 7 of the Constitution of Botswana." Id.
at 28.
167. Id. at 29.
168. See id. at 40.
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unusual punishment" under the U.S. Constitution'6 9 and explored how
the U.S. Supreme Court has defined "cruel" in its jurisprudence as an
informative parallel to the concepts of "inhuman" and "degrading" in the
Botswanan provisions.17°
In neighboring Zimbabwe, the Supreme Court addressed a similar
question on the constitutionality of corporal punishment sentencing pro-
visions in State v. Ncube.'7' Justice Gubbay began his opinion with a
survey of Zimbabwean law, which contained six statutes that authorize
the sentence of whipping as a punishment for various crimes.' The con-
stitutional provision under consideration by the Court contained
precisely the same wording as the provision of the Constitution of Bot-
swana considered in Petrus v. State.'73 After his exposition of the state of
the law on corporal punishment in Zimbabwe, Justice Gubbay proceeded
to establish the legal status of corporal punishment in various countries,
canvassing South Africa,'74 the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia,
75
and the United States of America. '7 In this comparative survey, Justice
Gubbay sought to establish whether there exists a universal standard on
such corporal punishment. He concluded that "[m]odern conceptions of
justice and humanity have led most European and Scandinavian coun-
tries totally to deny the utility of corporal punishment. And, I believe, the
same is true of Argentina, Mexico, India, Ghana, Jamaica, and Belize.' 7
In construing the language of section 15(1) of the Zimbabwean Con-
stitution, Justice Gubbay found that this provision encompasses the
range of five types of prohibitions that Justice Aguda found under the
identical provision in Botswana in Petrus17 and cites to that case for
169. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII ("excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted").
170. See Petrus, [1984] BLR at 40.
171. State v. Ncube, 1987 (2) ZLR 246 (S.Ct.).
172. See id. at 251-52. Many of these statutes limit the number of strokes of a whipping.
See id. The Prison Act even mandates that whipping must be carried out under medical super-
vision. See id. at 262. These facts are relevant because the court in Petrus was careful to limit
its decision to the type of repeated and delayed punishment at issue in the case.
173. Compare ZIMB. CONST. ch. Ill, § 15(1) ("No person shall be subjected to torture or
to inhuman or degrading punishment or other such treatment.") with BOTS. CONST. ch. II,
§ 7(1), supra note 157. See ZIMB. CONST. ch. IlI (containing the constitution's Declaration of
Rights).
174. Justice Gubbay determined that the punishment of whipping was at the time legal in
South Africa, yet cited to a number of South African cases that described corporal punishment
as brutal and degrading. See Ncube, 1987 (2) ZLR at 253-57.
175. Canada, the United Kingdom, and Australia (with one exception, the state of West-
em Australia) had passed legislation outlawing corporal punishment. See id. at 257-61.
176. Whipping remained legal in certain states of the United States, although it was
outlawed as a punishment imposed by federal courts for federal offences. See id. at 261.
177. Id. at 261-62.
178. See supra text accompanying note 168.
[Vol. 24:103
African Courts, International Law
support.'79 Additionally, like the Court in Petrus, Justice Gubbay found
the "inhuman and degrading" constitutional provision similar enough to
the "cruel and unusual punishment" provision of the U.S. Constitution to
draw upon U.S. case law to explore the scope of the definition of "inhu-
man and degrading punishment."18
Further, Justice Gubbay recognized that the decision in this case ul-
timately depended on a value judgment of the nature of punishment with
regard to the underlying fundamental right. In determining his own opin-
ion on this matter, he was swayed by the emerging consensus of the
unconstitutionality of whipping. Here, he relied heavily upon "perhaps
... the most important ... decision ... of the European Court of Human
Rights in Tyrer v. United Kingdom ... [which] was concerned directly
with article 3 of the European Convention of Human Rights-a Provi-
sion worded virtually identically to [section] 15(1) of the Constitution of
Zimbabwe."'8 ' All five cases covering corporal punishment in this sub-
section cited to the European Court's Tyrer 82 opinion as authoritative
precedent for their national decisions. This proves the importance of the
link between the European Convention, post-independence African bills
of rights, the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights, and the
emerging human rights jurisprudence of national courts in Africa.'83
In holding that corporal punishment is unconstitutional, Justice
Gubbay revealed that he was most persuaded by his view of the inhuman
and degrading character of corporal punishment. 4 He explained that he
was also influenced by:
(i) the current trend of thinking amongst those distinguished ju-
rists and leading academics to whom reference has been
made;
(ii) the abolition of whipping in very many countries of the world
as being repugnant to the consciences of civilised men;
(iii) the progressive move of the courts in countries in which
whipping is not susceptible to constitutional attack, to restrict
179. See id. at 264 ("Certainly that was the construction applied to the identical protec-
tion by both the European Court of Human Rights in Tyrer v. United Kingdom ... and in
[State] v. Petrus... and I am in respectful agreement with it... " (citations omitted)).
180. Id. at 266.
181. Id. at 269-70.
182. Tyrer v. United Kingdom, 26 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 4 (1978).
183. See generally Heyns, supra note 50; Lovemore Madhuku, The Impact of the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights in Africa: The Zimbabwean Experience, 8 AFR. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 932 (1996).
184. Ncube, 1987 (2) ZLR at 274.
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its imposition to instances where a serious, cruel, brutal and
humiliating crime has been perpetrated; and
(iv) the decreasing recourse to the penalty of whipping in this
country . ... 85
This quotation serves as a guide to the underlying types of authority
that can be gleaned from the international sources surveyed by these Af-
rican courts: the intellectual consensus of judicial and legal elites, the
global trend to prohibit corporal punishment, the progressive judicial
activism of courts to limit the reach of legislation, and the local trend
toward this practice. The method of Justice Gubbay in Ncube typifies the
approach of most of these courts: after surveying this wide range of
sources, the ultimate basis of the judgment remains unknown.
The Zimbabwean Supreme Court faced the question of the constitu-
tionality of criminal statutes that impose whipping or corporal
punishment on juveniles in light of section 15(1) of the Constitution of
Zimbabwe two years after the Ncube decision. In State v. A Juvenile,
86
Chief Justice Dumbutschena wrote for the Court and relied heavily on
his own Court's reasoning in Ncube. His task in A Juvenile was to de-
termine whether corporal punishment is any less inhuman or degrading
if applied to juveniles rather than adults.'87 The opinion revisited the
European Court's decision in Tyrer v. United Kingdom to further explore
supportive language from that Court that establishes that corporal pun-
ishment, by nature, offends the dignity of a person.181 Chief Justice
Dumbutschena then examined the dissenting opinion in another Euro-
pean Court case, Campbell v. United Kingdom, 89 which expressed the
view that the nature of corporal punishment is degrading within the
meaning of article 3 of the European Convention. Although the facts and
context of Campbell differed from those of A Juvenile, Chief Justice
Dumbutschena still voiced his agreement with the dissenter in that case
in support of his determination under the Zimbabwean Constitution.'90
Two aspects of separate opinions in this case are worth noting. First,
Justice Gubbay's concurrence revisited the international sources sur-
185. Id. at 273-74.
186. State v. A Juvenile, 1989 (2) ZLR 61 (S.Ct.).
187. See id. at 72.
188. See id. at 73.
189. 48 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1982).
190. See A Juvenile, 1989 (2) ZLR at 80-81. As Chief Justice Dumbutschena describes,
Campbell & Cosans decided that corporal punishment meted out as punishment by a govern-
ment school must conform to the normal standards set by the Court for article 3 of the
European Convention. See id. Other international sources referred to in this opinion include a
dissenting opinion of Justice White in the U.S. case of Ingraham v. Wright as well as the opin-
ion of the European Commission of Human Rights in Warwick v. United Kingdom. See id.
[Vol. 24:103
African Courts, International Law
veyed in his Ncube opinion. In recognizing, however, that "there is no
explicit reference in international human rights instruments to corporal
punishment as a judicial sanction," he nonetheless believed that an "in-
road has been made by the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for
the Administration of Juvenile Justice." 9 This citation is worth noting
for the persuasive weight placed on this nonbinding international state-
ment of understanding in a national court. Second, in dissenting from the
opinion of the Court, Justice McNally placed equal importance on inter-
national sources to support his position. He claimed that since the
European Court in Tyrer did not pronounce that corporal punishment is
per se degrading, there is room to find the corporal punishment under
question not a violation of the constitutional norm. 92 He associated him-
self with the dissenting opinion in that case.
193
Petrus, Ncube, and A Juvenile established a body of southern African
precedent on the constitutionality of corporal punishment that was relied
upon by other courts in neighboring countries. The Namibian Supreme
Court addressed this issue in a 1991 decision, Ex parte Attorney-
General, Namibia.94 In the earlier cases, individual plaintiffs challenged
their sentences of corporal punishment. In Ex parte Attorney-General,
Namibia, the issue presented itself to the Court by way of a petition from
the Attorney General. The constitutional provision under consideration,
chapter 3, article 8, contains the exact language of those provisions in
the constitutions of Zimbabwe and Botswana ' and the scope of the case
covered corporal punishment sanctioned by the judiciary, administrative,
191. See id., at 91 (citing to rule 17:3, which states that "[j]uveniles should not be sub-
jected to corporal punishment").
192. See id. at 93.
193. See id. at 96.
194. Ex parte Attorney-Gen., Namib. (In re Corporal Punishment by Organs of the
State), (1992) 103 I.L.R. 81 (Namib.).
195. See NAMIB. CONST. ch. 3, art. 8. The article reads:
Article 8 Respect for Human Dignity
(1) The dignity of all persons shall be inviolable.
(2) (a) In any judicial proceedings or in other proceedings before any organ of the
State, and during the enforcement of a penalty, respect for human dignity shall
be guaranteed.
(b) No persons shall be subject to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment.
Furthermore, although article 24 of chapter 3 governs acceptable derogations in terms of pub-
lic emergency, national defense, and martial law, article 24(3) lists the articles of the
Constitution, including article 8, that are non-derogable. See NAMIB. CONST. ch. 3, sec. 24(3).
In discussing the scope of article 8, Justice Mahomed makes a point to establish that the
government can never derogate from the rights accorded under this article. See Ex parte
Attorney-Gen., Namib., (1992) 103 I.L.R. at 93.
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and quasi-administrative organs, and by government schools through a
series of statutes.
96
Justice Mahomed, writing for the Court, relied heavily upon Ncube
for several propositions' 97 and was aware of the international precedent in
the area of corporal punishment under similar constitutional provisions.
He wrote, "The provisions of [article] 8(2) of the Constitution are not
peculiar to Namibia; they articulate a temper throughout the civilised
world which has manifested itself consciously since the 1939-45 war."'98
After listing a series of international conventions and other national con-
stitutions,' 99 he continued:
[i]n the interpretation of such articles there is strong support for
the view that the imposition of corporal punishment on adults by
organs of the [S]tate is indeed degrading or inhuman and incon-
sistent with civilised values ....
In the result there is beginning to emerge an accelerating con-
sensus against corporal punishment for adults throughout the
civilised world.2°
This consensus led Justice Mahomed to conclude that corporal pun-
ishment for adults in Namibia is unconstitutional, thereby raising his
country's law and policies to conform to the norms of the "civilized"
world. As the statutes under consideration provided for such punishment
to juveniles as well, Justice Mahomed then turned to A Juvenile. In high-
201lighting the international sources discussed in A Juvenile, Justice
Mahomed found sufficient support to conclude that juvenile corporal
punishment also violates article 8(1) of the Namibian Constitution.
The most recent court opinion examined in this Section is the South
African Constitutional Court's decision of State v. Williams, which ad-
dressed the constitutionality of a provision of the Criminal Act that
provided for corporal punishment for juveniles. As in the previous cases,
the constitutional provision under consideration here involves the scope
196. See Ex parte Attorney-Gen., Namib., (1992) 103 I.L.R. at 84-92.
197. For example, Justice Mahomed cites to Ncube for a definition of "to degrade" and
for the proposition that determining what can be classified as "inhuman and degrading" neces-
sitates a value judgment by the Court. See id. at 93.
198. Id. at 94.
199. See id. Specifically, Justice Malomed refers to article 3 of the European Conven-
tion, article 1(1) of the German Constitution, article 7 of the Constitution of Botswana, and
article 15(1) of the Zimbabwean Constitution. Id.
200. Id.
201. See id. at 101.
202. 1995 (3) SALR 632 (CC).
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of the right to be free from "inhuman or degrading treatment or punish-
ment., 203 This case primarily relied on the southern African cases already
discussed in this Section and examined additional international sources.
Of all of the international sources considered, in Justice Langa's
opinion, "the decisions of the Supreme Courts of Namibia and Zim-
babwe are of special significance. Not only are these countries
geographic neighbors, but South Africa shares with them the same Eng-
lish colonial experience which has had a deep influence on our law; we
of course also share the Roman-Dutch legal tradition.,,2' This statement
is particularly remarkable for its implications. It recognizes and gives
primacy to the authority of the more localized human rights jurispru-
dence emerging in the region. In doing so, given the foundations of the
regional jurisprudence in references to international human rights in-
struments and global comparative jurisprudence, the South African
Court's comment reflects the increasing universalization of this particu-
lar human rights norm. In keeping with this policy, Justice Langa relied
upon the decisions of Ncube, A Juvenile, and Ex parte Attorney-General,
Namibia, as well as Petrus, for support. He did so to establish the scope
of the language of section 11(2) of the South African Constitution, 20 to
describe the inhuman and degrading nature of corporal punishment,2 6
and to provide factual support on the status of the legality of corporal
punishment around the world.0 7
Following the South African constitutional directive to use interna-
tional law as an interpretive device, Justice Langa cited liberally to
international human rights treaties, comparative national constitutional
provisions,08 and various court decisions adjudicating these provisions.
He concluded that "[t]here is unmistakably a growing consensus in the
203. S. AFR. CONST. ch. 3, § 11 (2) ("No person shall be subjected to torture of any kind,
whether physical, mental or emotional, nor shall any person be subject to cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment.").
204. Williams, 1995 (3) SALR at 642.
205. See id. at 639.
206. See id. at 645.
207. See id. at 644 (drawing from Ncube's survey of the legality of corporal punish-
ment); see also supra text accompanying notes 175-177.
208. In Justice Langa's words:
Whether one speaks of "cruel and unusual punishment", as in the Eighth Amend-
ment of the United States Constitution and in [article] 12 of the Canadian Charter,
or "inhuman or degrading punishment", as in the European Convention and the
Constitution of Zimbabwe, or "cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment", as in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the ICCPR and the Constitution of Na-
mibia, the common thread running through the assessment of each phrase is the
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international community that judicial whipping, involving as it does the
deliberate infliction of physical pain on the person of the accused, of-
fends society's notions of decency and is a direct invasion of the right




2. Capital Punishment, the Death Row Phenomenon, and
"cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment"
The phenomenon of using international sources as support for de-
termining the scope of a fundamental right also occurs in cases that
challenge the constitutionality of capital punishment and the death row
phenomenon. An examination of three cases concerning these issues
provides further proof of how referencing regional African and interna-
tional sources has led to progressive decision making.
The first groundbreaking decision under discussion in this field
came from the author of the Ncube decision, Chief Justice Gubbay of the
Zimbabwean Supreme Court.2 ° In Catholic Commission for Justice &
Peace in Zimbabwe v. Attorney-General,2 ' Chief Justice Gubbay faced
the question of whether proceeding with the sentence of execution by
hanging for murder convictions violates the "inhuman and degrading
punishment" provision of section 15(1) of the Zimbabwean Constitu-
212tion. The four men received their sentences for capital punishment in
1988 and languished in prison after their appeals had failed. The Minis-
try of Justice announced their execution suddenly in March 1993.3
Essentially, the question before the Court was whether the mental
anguish suffered by these prisoners in anticipation of their pending sen-
tences was so severe that proceeding with the sentence of capital
punishment would constitute a violation of their fundamental right to be
free from inhuman and degrading punishment. As the constitutional pro-
vision under consideration was the same one the Court examined in
Ncube and A Juvenile, the Chief Justice cited these Zimbabwean prece-
dents for preliminary guidance as to the scope of the language of this
provision)' 4 The opinion, however, focused on establishing factual proof
of the consequences of the death row phenomenon and surveyed com-
parative law on the status of the legality of lengthy delays in proceeding
209. Id. at 644.
210. Justice Gubbay became the acting Chief Justice of the Zimbabwean Supreme Court
in 1991. See 2 HUMAN RIGHTS LAW IN AFRICA 1997, supra note 10, at 315. He was forced to
resign as Chief Justice and leave the Court in March 2001 under pressure by President Robert
Mugabe. See John Jeter, The 'Endgame' in Zimbabwe? Top Judge's Retirement New Blow to
Democracy, WASH. POST, Mar. 3, 2001, at Al.
211. 1993 (l) ZLR 242 (S.Ct.).
212. See id. at 245; see also ZIMB. CONST. ch. IIl, §15(1).
213. See Catholic Commission, 1993 (1) ZLR at 244-45.
214. See id. at 251.
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with executions. Before engaging in this analysis, the Chief Justice first
cited to international sources for help in deciding a procedural matter. He
referred to two decisions from India and Jamaica to support placing the
burden of proof in this case, one in which a fundamental right is as-
serted, on the party raising the violation of a fundamental right.
215
The methodology and structure of the Catholic Commission opinion
follows closely that of its author in Ncube. Chief Justice Gubbay first
established the widespread recognition of the death row phenomenon by
courts of international jurisdictions and by academics, to establish the
factual record of the suffering involved in delayed death sentences.26 The
Chief Justice continued with a survey of judicial attitudes toward the
constitutionality of executions given a long delay, canvassing precedent
in Zimbabwe, India, the United States, and the West Indies.2 7 He then
engaged in a substantial examination of the European Court's decision in
Soering v. United Kingdom that blocked the extradition from the United
Kingdom of a suspect wanted for trial to the United States. That opinion
held that the suffering that the suspect would experience on death row
breached the right granted under article 3 of the European Convention.28
Lastly, he referred to decisions of the United Nations Human Rights
Committee considering the Committee's attitude toward the death row
phenomenon given States' obligations under article 7 of the ICCPR.2 9
This survey of international sources shows how these opinions do
not lend greater deference to treaties or international instruments that are
binding on their countries as would be presumed given their status under
international law.220 In this case, for example, the ICCPR and the J.N.
Human Rights Committee decisions should have greater force on Zim-
babwe. Yet the Court's opinion treated these sources on a par with those
of the European Court of Human Rights or other courts of comparative
jurisprudence. This indicates that the Court viewed its role primarily as
one of elevating its national human rights jurisprudence to the interna-
tional or civilized standard rather than acting as a locus of judicial
review of Zimbabwe's compliance with its obligations under interna-
tional law.
Strikingly, the survey of international sources by the Court revealed
the indeterminate nature of judicial precedent and the lack of consensus
215. See id. at 252.
216. In making this point, reference is made to short excerpts of factual findings by the
U.S. Supreme Court, a state district court in Massachusetts, and the Supreme Courts of India
and Jamaica. See id. at 253-56.
217. See id. at 256-70.
218. See id. at 270-73.
219. See id. at 274-75.
220. See supra discussion in Section I.A.
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on this subject that would likely support a finding of unconstitutionality
in the case before the Zimbabwean Court.2 ' Nonetheless, Chief Justice
Gubbay embraced whatever support he could find to bolster his eventual
holding that struck down the pending execution of the prisoners as un-
constitutional. This resulted in his reliance on the majority opinions in
several Indian cases, the dissenting opinions in a Jamaican case,223 a
Canadian case, 22 and the dissenter in the U.N. Human Rights Committee
decision.2 2 ' He even surveyed the opinions of different courts in the
United States that have explored the death row phenomenon, including
state court decisions from California, Georgia, and Massachusetts, and
federal district court and appellate decisions, regardless of their eventual
position on this issue.2 " Reaching a landmark conclusion, Chief Justice
Gubbay set aside the execution sentences and substituted them with a
sentence of life imprisonment. 
227
The one Nigerian case that addressed the issue of the constitutional-
ity of a delayed death sentence involved procedural rather than
substantive issues. 8 In Ogugu v. State,229 five prisoners challenged their
death sentences directly in the Nigerian Supreme Court. The prisoners,
convicted in 1986, challenged their sentences as unconstitutional under
the inhuman and degrading treatment provision, section 31(1)(a) of the
Nigerian Constitution.2 " The legality of the sentence was also called into
question under article 5 of the African Charter.' As this case was the
first court proceeding at which the appellants raised the constitutional
221. The Chief Justice found that the U.S. Supreme Court has not ruled on this issue,
and other state court opinions shun staying executions as a result of the causation for delay
lying with the petitioner's choice to prolong relitigating her case through the legal system as a
stalling mechanism, a view that was found to be shared by the Privy Council of the West In-
dies. See Catholic Commission, 1993 (1) ZLR at 274-75.
222. See id. at 259-61.
223. See id. at 269-70 ("In my respectful view the minority opinion is to be preferred to
that of the majority. It applied the liberal interpretation of fundamental rights ... and accords
with the evolving standards in any civilised country.").
224. See id. at 274.
225. See id. at 275 ("It is this latter approach that I find the more compelling.").
226. See id. at 261-66.
227. See id. at 284.
228. This is a result of the unique legal framework for human rights in Nigeria given that
country's constitutional fundamental rights provisions alongside the legislative implementa-
tion of the African Charter. See UMOZURIKE, supra note 16.
229. [1998] 1 HUM. RTS. L. REP. AFR. 167 (Nig. 1994).
230. See id. at 181. The full text of the constitutional provision is never cited in the opin-
ion in Ogugu.
231. See African Charter, supra note 1, art. 5, 21 I.L.M. at 60 ("Every individual shall
have the right to the respect of the dignity inherent in a human being and to the recognition of
his legal status. All forms of exploitation and degradation of man particularly slavery, slave
trade, torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment and treatment shall be prohibited.")
(emphasis added).
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question, the Nigerian Supreme Court first addressed the issue of
whether it had jurisdiction to hear this issue. According to section 42(1)
of the Nigerian Constitution, "[a]ny person who alleges that any of the
provisions of [Chapter IV on Fundamental Rights] has been, is being or
likely to be contravened in any State in relation to him may apply to a
High Court in that State for redress.,
32
The Court held that Nigerian procedural rules denied that Court
original jurisdiction of the case and dismissed the case without address-
ing the constitutional questions on their merits. Nevertheless, the
appellants, respondents, and the Attorneys General of many Nigerian
states who were asked to submit amici curiae to the Court made refer-
ence to Catholic Commission and many of the international sources cited
within that decision. 1' The Court never reached the issues on the merits,
but it still used international sources for procedural guidance.
The initial procedural question addressed involved the lack of a
mechanism to enforce the African Charter and the African Charter Rati-
fication and Enforcement Act. Counsel for one appellant presented two
arguments. First, he claimed that the right violated in this case consti-
tutes a fundamental right that is "intrinsic to the proceedings of every
case and could therefore properly form the basis of appeals from those
proceedings. 234 Second, he claimed that the Court should assume juris-
diction since the right under article 5 of the African Charter is
independent of the fundamental rights in the Constitution. As the African
Charter Ratification and Enforcement Act lacks a domestic enforcement
process, he urged the Court that the "lacunae in penal and fundamental
rights provision were usually interpreted to save jurisdiction.235
Justice Bello, writing for the Court, remained unpersuaded by both
of counsel's contentions. He concluded that the Nigerian Constitution
recognizes two categories of rights. One category comprises rights that
must be observed, because they are "intrinsic to the occasion.236 These
include procedural rights such as the right to a fair trial. If a right in this
first category is violated, the issue of its violation can be raised in the
Supreme Court on appeal. The other category of substantive rights con-
sists of those that are enforceable in the High Courts as provided in
232. NIG. CONST. ch. IV, § 42(1) (1979), reprinted in Ogugu, [1998] 1 HUM. RTs. L.
REP. AFR. at 169.
233. A list of the amici curiae submissions are listed before the text of the opinion. See
Ogugu, [1998] 1 HUM. RTS. L. REP. AFR. at 179-80. The arguments of the various parties are
summarized at the beginning of Justice Bello's opinion. Some submissions relied on the inter-
national sources to argue for a substantive decision on the merits, while others used them
simply to raise procedural issues. See id. at 182-87.
234. See id. at 186.
235. See id. at 187.
236. Id. at 189.
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section 42 of the Nigerian Constitution. Having established these catego-
ries, Justice Bello inquired into which of these categories the rights
under article 5 of the African Charter belong.
It is in this inquiry that Justice Bello surveyed comparative law. "I
think it is germane to the issue to examine the cases on subjection to in-
humanity decided by the courts of the common law countries cited by
learned counsel and to see the process for their adjudication." '237 He spe-
cifically examined Catholic Commission, and some of the West Indian,
Indian, and Californian and Massachusetts state court decisions238 that
were examined for their substantive determinations in Catholic Commis-
sion. His survey showed that "in those common law countries the issue
similar to the constitutional question in our present appeal was taken in a
court vested with original jurisdiction to adjudicate on the matter after
the convict, where he had exercised his rights of appeal against convic-
tion, had exhausted the rights."239 As section 42(2) of the Nigerian
Constitution places original jurisdiction over fundamental rights cases in
the High Courts of Nigeria, the Supreme Court held that it lacked juris-
diction to address the rights raised in Ogugu in the first instance.
The landmark South African decision of State v. Makwanyane4
well known for its liberal use of international and comparative sources,
addressed the constitutionality of the death penalty. The challenge to the
death penalty primarily arose under section 11 (2), the "cruel, inhuman or
degrading punishment or treatment" provision24 of the South African
Constitution, yet was also examined in light of sections 8,242 9,243 and
10.24 The discussion here only highlights the commonalities of Mak-
wanyane's use of international sources with the other cases discussed in
this Section. 5
237. Id. at 190.
238. See id. at 190-92.
239. Id. at 192.
240. 1995 (3) SALR 391 (CC).
241. See S. AFR. CONST. (Interim Constitution) ch. 3, § 11(2) (1993) ("No person shall
be subjected to torture of any kind, whether physical, mental or emotional, nor shall any per-
son be subject to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.").
242. See id. ch 3, § 8(l) (1993) ("Every person shall have the right to equality before the
law and to equal protection of the law.").
243. See id. ch. 3, § 9 (1993) ("Every person shall have the right to life.").
244. See id. ch. 3, § 10 (1993) ("Every person shall have the right to respect for and
protection of his or her dignity."); Makwanyane, 1995 (3) SALR at 403-05.
245. The use of international sources for interpretive support in Makwanyane figures
prominently across President Chaskalson's opinion and the ten concurrences. This case has
been explored in depth by numerous authors. See, e.g., Ursula Bentele, Back to an Interna-
tional Perspective on the Death Penalty as a Cruel Punishment: The Example of South Africa,
73 TUL. L. REV. 251 (1998); Peter Norbert Bouckaert, Shutting Down the Death Factory: The
Abolition of Capital Punishment in South Africa, 32 STAN. J. INT'L L. 287 (1996); Jeremy
Sarkin, Problems and Challenges Facing South Africa's Constitutional Court: An Evaluation
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First, in a subsection entitled "International and foreign comparative
law," President Chaskalson examined capital punishment in the United
States and India and canvassed opinions of the U.N. Human Rights
Committee and the European Court of Human Rights that focus on the
treatment of the rights to dignity, life, and freedom from cruel, inhuman1 - 46
and degrading punishment. This survey was intended to contextualize
the South African decision with international attitudes and to offer com-
parative views on the scope of rights in national views and international
forums. At the start of the survey, President Chaskalson warned, "We can
derive assistance from public international law and foreign case law, but
we are in no way bound to follow it. '247 In concluding that a sentence of
capital punishment was unconstitutional under the South African Consti-
tution, he anchored his opinion in his view that "the rights to life and
dignity are the most important of all human rights, and the source of all
other personal rights in [chapter] 3. By committing ourselves to a society
founded on the recognition of human rights we are required to value
these two rights above all others. 2 8
Second, the Makwanyane opinion relied upon the African case law
discussed in this Section. It found these cases to be of equal persuasive
authority as the other international sources surveyed in the opinion.
Catholic Commission is the most prominent case that is mentioned
throughout various opinions in this decision, for its description of the
249death row phenomenon, its definition of the meaning of the Zimbab-
wean constitutional provision on the right to be free from inhuman and
degrading punishment or treatment,25 ° Chief Justice Gubbay's transparent
exercise of a value judgment in deciding the case,25' and a strong state-
ment from dicta describing the importance of safeguarding thefundmentl rih s f " 252
fundamental rights of prisoners. Concurring judgments in Makwan-
yane make additional references to Ex parte Attorney-General, Namibia
and Ncube.
These cases reveal the general techniques that numerous African
courts have used to invoke international sources as interpretive devices
and authoritative precedent for determining the scope of fundamental
rights enshrined in constitutional bills of rights. African judges invoke
provisions of international treaties, even if they have not been
of Its Decisions on Capital and Corporal Punishment, 113 S. AFR. L.J. 71 (1996); Carol S.
Steiker, Pretoria, Not Peoria: S v. Makwanyane and Another, 74 TEx. L. REV. 1285 (1996).
246. See Makwanyane, 1995 (3) SALR at 412-35.
247. See id. at 415.
248. Id.
249. See id. at 402, 471,485,509.
250. See id. at 462, 464, 485.
251. See id. at 499 (Mokgoro, J., concurring).
252. See id. at 507 (O'Regan, J., concurring).
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incorporated into the municipal legal order. Yet these judges do not give
any interpretive primacy to these treaties over nonbinding instruments or
other informal statements of principles.
Furthermore, given the choice of relying upon universalized human
rights norms as enshrined in their Western expression in U.N. treaties
and the European Convention or their particularized expression in the
African Charter, the African Courts have relied more on the universal
international treaties than their regional alternative. This could be a con-
sequence of two factors. First, given these judges' evident interest in
establishing national human rights norms that are equivalent to the inter-
national or civilized standards, relying too heavily on the African Charter
and less on the international treaties would contribute less explicitly to
that goal. Second, the African Charter has rarely been the subject of na-
tional or international scrutiny and interpretation. Consequently,
opinions from the European Court and the U.N. Human Rights Commit-
tee provide national courts with an established body of jurisprudential
precedent to rely upon.
C. Tensions Between International Norms, Judicial License,
and African Traditions
Although the evidence from the cases analyzed in this Part indicates
that judges actively employed international sources as support for adopt-
ing a liberal approach to constitutional interpretation and to determine
the scope of fundamental rights enshrined in national constitutions, these
judges did so not without ignorance of the consequences of their tech-
nique. Despite the impression that these opinions wholeheartedly
embraced the enterprise of relying on international sources, interspersed
throughout these opinions are qualifying comments that indicate an
awareness of the groundbreaking nature of what the courts are doing.
This Section explores several examples that demonstrate the tension that
the internationalist enterprise places on traditions and customary laws or
practices. It does so first by analyzing three cases that involve women's
rights and second by highlighting passages from various cases that are
pertinent to this query.
1. The Challenge of Women's Rights
to the Internationalist Agenda
One of the greatest challenges to human rights in Africa is the reali-
zation of the right of women to equality before the law and freedom
from discrimination, given the traditional roles ascribed to women
throughout various countries, cultures, and communities. Several at-
tempts have been made to challenge discriminatory laws and treatment
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in African courts. This Subsection examines five such cases, decisions
from Tanzania (1990), Botswana (1992), Zimbabwe (1994 and 1999),
and Zambia (1992). In order to highlight how these courts deal with the
tension between fundamental human rights and traditionalist views and
laws on women, this discussion focuses on these courts' references to
international sources as they are used to determine the interpretational
policy of the court as well as the substance of rights discussed in the
opinions.
In Ephrahim v. Pastory,253 the Tanzanian High Court faced the issue
of determining the constitutionality of a discriminatory customary law
provision on inheritance in light of the provisions of the Tanzanian Bill
of Rights that was incorporated into the Tanzanian Constitution in 1984.
Holaria Pastory inherited clan land and later sold it to a non-clan mem-
ber, in direct contravention of a Haya customary law provision that
denies women the power to sell clan land.25 4 Pastory's nephew sued for a
declaration that the sale of the land was void under customary law. The
District Court ruled for Pastory, recognizing Pastory's right under the
Constitution to sell land.25 Ephrahim appealed to the High Court to chal-
lenge this judgment.
In writing for the court, Justice Mwalusanya recognized that not
only was the Haya customary law clear on this matter as it is codified in
the Laws of Inheritance of the Declaration of Customary Law,256 but also
that Tanzanian precedent mandated that the courts are "bound by the
Customary law" at issue.27 Nonetheless, he claimed that this precedent
must be reexamined in light of the incorporation in 1984 of the Bill of
Rights into the Tanzanian Constitution, including the nondiscrimination
provision in section 13(4),258 despite the fact that the Bill of Rights had
253. (1990) 87 I.L.R. 106 (Tanz. High Ct.).
254. See id. at 107.
255. See id. at 109.
256. See id. at 107-08.
257. Bi Verdiana Kyabuje v. Gregory, (1968) HCD No. 499, quoted in Ephrahim, (1990)
87 I.L.R. at 108 ("Thus, if a customary law draws a distinction in a matter of this nature be-
tween males and females, it does not fall to this Court to decide that such law is inappropriate
to modem development and conditions. That must be done elsewhere than in the courts of
law.") Justice Mwalusanya cited three additional Tanzanian cases that upheld the discrimina-
tory customary law denying women the power to sell clan land. See id.
258. The Tanzanian High Court decided Ephrahim in 1990. It did not provide the full
text of the constitutional provisions at issue in its decision. Despite minor editorial changes,
the constitutional provisions before the Ephrahim court in 1990 resemble those in today's
constitution. The current text of the Tanzanian antidiscrimination provision reads: "No person
shall be discriminated against by any person or any authority acting under any law or in the
discharge of the functions or business of any [S]tate office." TANZ. CONST. § 13(4) (1992).
This provision specifies the role of the courts and other State agencies to protect the funda-
mental fights in the Tanzanian Constitution. See also TANZ. CONST. § 13(3) (1992) ("The civil
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been deemed by some to be a "dead letter."'259 Justice Mwalusanya pro-
ceeded to list the international human rights instruments ratified by
Tanzania , that also guarantee nondiscrimination. Having established
Tanzania's commitment to international human rights norms, he con-
cluded:
The principles enunciated in the above named documents are a
standard below which any civilized nation will be ashamed to
fall. It is clear from what I have discussed that the customary
law under discussion flies in the face of our Bill of Rights as
2611well as international conventions to which we are signatories.
Having determined that the Haya customary law provision is uncon-
stitutionally discriminatory, Justice Mwalusanya turned to deciding the
appropriate action of the court. Section 5(1) of the Tanzanian Constitu-
tion, added after the constitution was amended to include the Bill of
Rights, mandates that "the courts will construe the existing law, includ-
ing customary law ... with such modification, adoptions, qualifications
and exceptions as may be necessary to bring it into conformity with [the
Bill of Rights]. 262 Adopting the purposive approach to statutory
interpretation, he determined that the Parliament's intention behind
section 5(1) and the Bill of Rights was to "do away with all oppressive
and unjust laws in the past., 26' He then drew upon the judicial experience
in Zimbabwe after that country adopted a bill of rights. Having drawn
this parallel, he concluded, "the above case from Zimbabwe is
persuasive authority for the proposition of law that any existing law that
is inconsistent with the Bill of Rights should be regarded as modified
such that the offending part of the statute or law is void."
'2M
Consequently, he ruled the Rules of Inheritance modified and qualified
to give equal rights to men and women to sell clan land.265
rights, duties and interests of every person and community shall be protected and determined
by the courts of law or other [S]tate agencies established by or under the law.").
259. See Ephrahim, (1990) 87 I.L.R. at 110.
260. Justice Mwalusanya refers to CEDAW, article 18(3) of the African Charter, article
26 of the ICCPR, and article 7 of the Universal Declaration. See id. Section 9(f) of the Tanza-
nian Constitution makes an explicit reference to the Universal Declaration, "[T]he [S]tate
authority and all its agencies are obliged to direct their policies and programmes towards en-
suring- ... that human dignity is preserved and upheld in accordance with the spirit of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights." TANZ. CONST. § 9(f) (1992).
261. Ephrahim, (1990) 87 I.L.R. at 110.
262. Id. at 113.
263. Id. at 115.
264. Id. at 116.
265. See id. at 119. Justice Mwalusanya concluded his opinion with a rather powerful
statement on women's rights:
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In sum, the Ephrahim court, faced with the recent incorporation of a
bill of rights that guarantees nondiscrimination and equal treatment be-
fore the law, determined its role as the judiciary to modify and qualify
customary law to realize the essence of the rights of women under the
Tanzanian Constitution. It did so with little hesitation. In Justice Mwalu-
sanya's eyes, when a tension between customary law and fundamental
rights exists, the international standards of the fundamental rights must
prevail at the expense of the traditional rules.
Two years later, the Botswana Court of Appeals reached a similar
decision in Dow v. Attorney-General,266 upholding fundamental rights for
women over discriminatory national laws. In this case, the Attorney-
General of Botswana appealed a decision of the High Court, which
struck down provisions of the Citizenship Act challenged by petitioner
Unity Dow as unconstitutionally discriminatory. Unity Dow, a citizen of
Botswana had three children of an American father. Their first child,
born out of wedlock, was entitled to Botswanan citizenship, yet the two
born after their marriage, were denied citizenship under the Act, which
confers citizenship in mixed marriages to children of Botswanan fathers
only. Dow challenged the Act as violative of sections 3 and 14 of the
Botswana Constitution .
The Court of Appeal, through Justice Amissah, framed its analysis of
the case as a question of constitutional construction and nondiscrimina-
tion. First, Justice Amissah established that the court must adopt a liberal
approach in construing the Constitution. He cited two Botswanan cases
as precedent for this policy of constitutional interpretation, and stated
that "[w]ith such pronouncements from our own court as a guide, we do
not really need to seek outside support for the views we express. But just
to show that we are not alone in the approach ... towards constitutional
interpretation, I refer to... dicta of judges from various jurisdictions. 268
From now on, females all over Tanzania can at least hold their heads high and claim
to be equal to men as far as inheritance of clan land and self-acquired land of their
father's is concerned. It is part of the long road to women's liberation. But there is
no cause for euphoria as there is much more to do in other spheres. One thing
which surprises me is that it has taken a simple, old rural woman to champion the
cause of women in this field but not the elite women in town who change jejune
slogans years on end on women's lib but without delivering the goods.
Id.
266. (1992) 103 I.L.R. 128 (Bots. Ct. App.).
267. See BOTs. CoNsT. ch. II, §§ 3, 14(1). Section 3 provides, "every person in Botswana
is entitled to the fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual, that is to say, the right,
whatever his race, place of origin, political opinions, colour, creed or sex...." Section 14(1)
provides, "No person shall be deprived of his freedom of movement... .
268. See Dow, (1992) 103 I.L.R. at 139.
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Next, Justice Amissah turned to an analysis of the substantive rights
at issue, deciding to analyze the Citizenship Act in light of section 15,
the Botswana Constitution's antidiscrimination provision.269 This provi-
sion does not explicitly guarantee freedom from discrimination based on
sex. Nevertheless, Justice Amissah read section 15 in conjunction with
section 3 to hold that the Constitution prohibits discrimination based on
sex.270 In reaching this conclusion, he drew a parallel to the scope of the
Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, which has been read to
cover discrimination despite the fact that the text refers to "equal treat-
* 271ment" rather than discrimination .
As for the tension between custom and fundamental rights, Justice
Amissah proclaimed: "A constitutional guarantee cannot be overridden
by custom. Of course, the custom will as far as possible be read so as to
conform to the Constitution. But where this is impossible, it is custom
not the Constitution which must go."'272 In reaching this conclusion,
Amissah also contended that the court's decision is bringing Botswanan
law in compliance with his country's international obligations under the
Universal Declaration and the African Charter.
The Attorney General, however, argued before the Court of Appeal
that the High Court's use of international sources in striking down the
Citizenship Act was inappropriate. To counter this contention, Justice
Amissah relied on the Interpretation Act of 1984, which states that "as
an aid to the construction of the enactment a court may have regard to
... any relevant international treaty, agreement or contention, 273 and
reiterated that it is the court's duty to interpret legislation in order to
comply with international obligations. 4 Justice Aguda, agreeing with
this approach, engaged in a substantial survey of international sources in
275his concurring opinion.
269. See BoTs. CONST. ch. 11, § 15(l) ("[N]o law shall make any provision that is dis-
criminatory either of itself or in its effect."). Importantly, the definition in that section of what
is discriminatory does not include sex. See BOTS. CONST. ch. I, § 15(3) ("[T]he expression
'discriminatory' means affording different treatment to different persons, attributable wholly
or mainly to their respective descriptions by race, tribe, place of origin, political opinions,
colour or creed....").
270. See Dow, (1992) 103 I.L.R. at 142. Justice Amissah emphasizes continually that
section 3 of the Botswana Constitution "confers on the individual the right to equal treatment
of the law ... irrespective of the person's sex." Id. at 150.
271. See id.
272. Id. at 145. He also posits, "[c]ustom and tradition have never been static." Id. For an
example of how attitudes change, he cites to how the U.S. Supreme Court once sanctioned
discrimination on the ground of race in Dred Scott v. Sanford, a position overturned and
scorned given evolving attitudes toward race. See id. at 156.
273. Id. at 159.
274. See id. at 161-62.
275. See id. at 175-79. References in his concurring opinion include quotes from Trop v.
Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958); Ex parte Attorney-Gen., Namib. (In re Corporal Punishment by
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The leading opinions in Dow give the impression that the Court of
Appeal overturned Botswanan customary norms in light of fundamental
rights without hesitation. This is not the case as it was in Ephrahim. Two
dissenters in Dow concluded that the Citizenship Act did not unconstitu-
tionally discriminate. In the opinions of Justice Schreiner and Justice
Puckrin, the text of section 15 clearly excludes sex from its definition of
discrimination. Justice Schreiner expressed that adopting a liberal inter-
pretational approach in cases like Ex parte Attorney-General, Namibia,
Petrus, and Ncube was justified only on account of the fact that the Jus-
tices were addressing the "vexed question of corporal punishment,,
276
and hence such a liberal approach would be unjustified in cases involv-
ing discrimination. Furthermore, he believed that it is beyond the
acceptable role of the court to "speculate or to express [its] own view"
on the content of customary law.2 77 Justice Puckrin disagreed with the
approach of the court disdainfully, "I do not perceive that it is my duty as
a judge of this court to impose my personal convictions upon an inter-
pretation of the Constitution. 278
Unity Dow nevertheless won her case and the Citizenship Act was
declared unconstitutional in its form at the time. Thereafter, the
Botswanan legislature amended the Act and passed the Citizenship
(Amendment) Act No. 14 of 1995 to conform to Dow.27"9
The Supreme Court of Zimbabwe considered a similar case to Dow
in 1994. In Rattigan v. Chief Immigration Officer, Zimbabwe,28 three
women citizens of Zimbabwe married to foreign husbands challenged
the constitutionality of the Zimbabwean Immigration Regulations which
placed restrictions on residence permits so that the mixed-marriage cou-
ples were unable to establish residency in Zimbabwe."' Although the
Court considered the Regulations in light of the privacy and freedom of
movement provisions of the Zimbabwean Constitution, 82 it relied
Organs of the State), (1992) 103 I.L.R. 81 (Namib.); speeches given at the Judicial Collo-
quium at Bangalore; and provisions from CEDAW and the African Charter. See Dow, (1992)
103 I.L.R. at 174-79. In his view, judges in Commonwealth countries "have started to express
the opinion that they have an obligation to ensure that the domestic laws of their countries
conform to the international obligations of those countries." Id. at 176.
276. Id. at 191.
277. Id. at 196.
278. Id. at 198.
279. See 2 HUMAN RIGHTS LAW IN AFRICA 1997, supra note 10, at 129.
280. (1994) 103 I.L.R. 224 (Zimb.).
281. See id. at 226-67. The policy states "the principal applicant for a family residence
permit should always be the husband unless the wife is a highly qualified professional ... 
Id. at 227.
282. See ZIMB. CONST. ch. III, §§ 11, 22 (Section 11: "[E]very person in Zimbabwe is
entitled to the fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual ... (c) protection for the
privacy of his home"; and section 22(1): "No person shall be deprived of his freedom of
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heavily upon decisions by international bodies concerning the rights
granted under article 17 of the ICCPR and article 8(1) of the European
Convention, which protect and promote the primacy of family life.
283
Based on these parallels, the Constitutional provisions, the fundamental
importance of marriage2 4 and an analogy to facts of the Dow case, 85 the
Zimbabwean Court struck down the Immigration Regulations as uncon-
stitutional.
The decision by the Rattigan Court was unanimous. Though the lan-
guage of the opinion did not speak of women's rights per se, the effect of
the decision clearly achieved a development in the equality of treatment
of women before the law in a particular instance, a development
achieved by the judiciary without any counterforce. Zimbabwean politi-
cal forces frowned upon this decision, however, and preempted the
consequences of the Rattigan decision through constitutional amend-
ment. 86 An exception to the freedoms guaranteed in section 22(1) was
added. Section 22(3)(d) now reads:
(3) Nothing contained in or done under the authority of any law
shall be held to be in contravention of subsection (1) to the ex-
tent that the law in question makes provision...
(d) for the imposition of restrictions on the movement or resi-
dence within Zimbabwe of persons who are neither citizens of
Zimbabwe nor regarded by virtue of a written law as perma-
nently resident in Zimbabwe. 287
The short-lived effect of the Rattigan Court's decision may have
presaged a more recent development in Zimbabwe in the area of
women's rights. In 1999, the Zimbabwean Supreme Court heard the case
of Magaya v. Magaya,28 a decision that embodies the tension between
movement, that is to say, the right to move freely throughout Zimbabwe, the right to reside in
any part of Zimbabwe, the right to enter and to leave Zimbabwe.").
283. See Rattigan, (1994) 103 I.L.R. at 232-33.
284. To stress the importance of marriage, Chief Justice Gubbay quotes passages from
two U.S. cases, including Loving v. Virginia, among other sources. See id. at 231.
285. See id. at 231-32.
286. See 2 HUMAN RIGHTS LAW IN AFRICA 1997, supra note 10, at 317.
287. ZIMB. CONST. ch. 1lI, § 22(3)(d).
288. Magaya v. Magaya, [19991 3 LRC 35 (Zimb.). For commentary on this case and its
significance for women's rights and human rights jurisprudence in Zimbabwe see generally
David M. Bigge & Am6lie von Briesen, Conflict in the Zimbabwean Courts: Women's Rights
and Indigenous Self-Determination in Magaya v. Magaya, 13 HARv. HUM. RTS. J. 289 (2000);
Simon Coldham, The Status of Women in Zimbabwe: Veneria Magaya v. Nakayi Shonwhiwa
Magaya (SC 210/98), 43 J. AFR. STUD. 248 (1999); Canaan F. Dube, Addressing the Gap
Between Customary and Statute Law and International Conventions: Zimbabwe's Twists and
Turns, 12 LEGAL F I, 12-13 (2000); Amy Shupikai Tsanga, Criticisms Against the Magaya
Decision: Mudo Ado About Something, I I LEGAL F 94 (1999).
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fundamental rights and customary law. In Magaya, contrary to the deci-
sions of the Tanzanian and Botswanan courts, the Zimbabwean Supreme
Court held that customary law prevails over the rights embodied in the
Zimbabwean Constitution.
In this case, Venia Magaya, the appellant, challenged a magistrate's
decision that granted heirship of her father's estate to her half-brother,
the son of her father's second wife. Venia Magaya's father married two
wives according to customary law and Venia was the only child of her
father's first wife. The Magistrate based his determination of heirship on
customary law, declaring "Venia is a lady [and] therefore cannot be ap-
pointed to [her] father's estate when there is a man. 289 The issue the
Court faced was whether customary heirship rules violate the nondis-
crimination provision of the Zimbabwean Constitution.
The constitutional provision under scrutiny was section 23. Section
23(1) establishes the general prohibition of discriminatory laws and sec-
tion 23(2) delineates the definition of what is to be considered
discriminatory. Like the provision of the Botswana Constitution that was
analyzed in Dow, section 23(2) does not include sex.29 Justice Muche-
chetere, resonating the views of the dissenters in Dow, flatly declared, "it
seems to me that these provisions do not forbid discrimination based on
sex."'29' Justice Muchechetere continued with one of the very few
references to international human rights in his opinion, "But even if they
did on account of Zimbabwe's adherence to gender equality enshrined in
international human rights instruments, there are exceptions to the provi-
sions."'2 92 The exception referred to is enshrined in section 23(3), which
excludes matters of personal law and the "application of African cus-
tomary law in any case involving Africans ... ,,293 from the prohibition of
discrimination in section 22(1)(a). Additionally, section 89 grants a gen-
eral sanction for the application of customary law in Zimbabwe.
Having so readily concluded that the Zimbabwean Constitution per-
mits derogations from the fundamental rights provisions when
customary law is implicated, Justice Muchechetere proceeded to analyze
the customary law rules in light of a statute entitled the Legal Age of
Majority Act. In so doing, he concluded that the legislative intent behind
the statute was to guarantee greater rights for women, but not at the
289. Magaya, [1999] 3 LRC at 40.
290. See ZIMB. CONST. ch. III, § 23(2) ("[A] law shall be regarded as having been treated
in a discriminatory manner if, as a result of that law or treatment, persons of a particular de-
scription by race, tribe, place of origin, political opinions, colour or creed are prejudiced
.... .).
291. See Magaya, [ 1999] 3 LRC at 41.
292. Id.
293. ZIMB. CONST. ch. III, § 23(3)(b).
Fall 2002]
Michigan Journal of International Law
expense of upsetting customary law.9 Furthermore, the courts in Ephra-
him and Dow dismissed arguments that customary law should be upheld
because of its traditional role in African society in favor of advancing
fundamental rights for women in order to join the ranks of civilized na-
tions. In stark contrast, Justice Muchechetere made a strong statement in
his opinion that great pains should be taken to preserve customary law
rules:
Whilst I am in total agreement with the submission that there is
a need to advance gender equality in all spheres of society, I am
of the view that great care must be taken when African custom-
ary law is under consideration. In the first instance, it must be
recognised that customary law has long directed the way African
people conducted their lives and the majority of Africans in
Zimbabwe still ... conduct their lives in terms of customary
law.... [I]t will not readily be abandoned.... 295
Furthermore, Justice Muchechetere expressed his view that it is his
role to apply customary law when it is appropriate and that it is the legis-
lature's role to change the law if that is their intention.296
The only instance in this opinion in which a specific international in-
strument was cited was in two block quotations from a scholar, T.W.
Bennett, author of a book on human rights and customary law in South
Africa.297 In this quotation, Bennett stresses the importance of the family
in African society, which he claims is buttressed by the references to the
African family in the African Charter, particularly the duties enumerated
in chapter 2 of the African Charter of individuals vis-h-vis their fami-
lies. 98 This quotation is interesting as it is the only citation to an
international human rights instrument, the African Charter, that is used
to support a decision that perhaps in the eyes of Justices Mwalusanya,
Amissah, and Aguda works counter to the fundamental right to equality
enshrined in that very same instrument. What it evidences is the manipu-
lability of the African Charter given its potentially conflicting mandates
of promoting human rights while upholding African traditions.299 In this
instance, because the African Charter was employed to uphold the tradi-
294. See Magaya, [ 1999] 3 LRC at 47-48.
295. Id. at 48. The two additional reasons Justice Muchechetere cites are on the one hand
the constitution's recognition of the customary law system and on the other the fact that the
application of customary law is voluntary. See id. at 49.
296. "I consider it prudent to pursue a pragmatic and gradual change which would win
long term acceptance rather than legal revolution initiated by the courts." Id. at 49.
297. See id.; see also T.W. BENNETT, HUMAN RIGHTS AND AFRICAN CUSTOMARY LAW
UNDER THE SOUTH AFRICAN CONSTITUTION (1995).
298. See BENNETT, supra note 297, at 6, quoted in Magaya, [1999] 3 LRC at 49.
299. See generally supra discussion in Section I.C.
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tionalist stance to the detriment of the antidiscrimination principle, it is
not surprising that Justice Muchechetere avoided invoking other interna-
tional human rights instruments. It is surprising however that Justice
Gubbay, the author of the Ncube decision and outspoken proponent on
human rights,3° silently joined such an opinion as he did. This decision
certainly indicates that justices are less willing to adopt liberal interpre-
tations of fundamental rights based on international norms when less
"vexing" questions30 ' are at stake, such as women's rights.
A last example of a women's rights case is the Zambian decision of
Longwe v. Intercontinental Hotels, decided by the Zambian High Court
in 1992.302 Juxtaposed with the recent Magaya decision it illustrates how
judicial activism through broad constitutional interpretation can lead to
extremely radical results on different sides of a spectrum. This case held
that the antidiscrimination and gender equality provisions of the Zam-
bian Constitution apply equally "to everybody: public or private persons
unless the context otherwise dictates."' 0 ' Concretely, the court held un-
constitutional the acts of the Intercontinental Hotel in denying a woman
access to the bar on the hotel premises. In reaching this decision, the
court cited to articles 1-3 of the African Charter and articles 1-3 of
CEDAW, °4 using the Charter in this instance to uphold article 2's
promise of the guarantee of the enjoyment of rights without distinction
of any kind, including gender.
2. Visible Tensions in the Exercise of Judicial Discretion
in African Human Rights Jurisprudence
Given the breadth of the use of international sources by the common
law judges examined in this Part, this Subsection examines certain
judges' awareness of the tension between adopting universalist human
rights norms without hesitation to the detriment of either particular Afri-
can practices in customary laws or a more general concept of a local or
indigenous value structure. The language of these judges reveals that
despite the awareness of the tension, most judges end up grafting univer-
sal norms onto their indigenous norms.
Courts have faced the tension between universalism and particular-
ism when addressing arguments proffered by counsel, often for the
governmental parties whose practices are being challenged by individual
litigants. These counsel argue against seeking support from international
300. See Gubbay, supra note 120.
301. See Dow v. Attomey-Gen., (1992) 103 I.L.R. 128, 189-98 (Bots. Ct. App.)
(Schreiner, J., dissenting).
302. [1993] 4 LRC 221 (Zambia 1992).
303. Id. at 231.
304. Id. at 227-28.
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sources and embracing universalist norms in favor of upholding some-
thing unique in either a local or a broader African culture. This
phenomenon can be seen in one of the cases on corporal punishment,
Petrus v. State, in which the Court forthrightly rejected counsel's relativ-
ist stance on the role of corporal punishment in African society. In
Petrus, the counsel for the government, defending the State practice of
whipping as judicial punishment, posited that "every African" is aware
of the deterrent functions of whipping: Justice Aguda flatly rejected
counsel's position by commenting, "[t]he assertions in this and in other
submissions of [counsel for the government] which tend to portray the
Africans as a different species of humanity different from all others, are
not only unwarranted as being degrading, but to put it very mildly most
unfortunate."3 °6
In this instance, the Botswanan Court resisted accepting that certain
practices, such as corporal punishment, were somehow acceptable for
Africans whereas the consensus of "civilized nations" had repudiated
such treatment as a violation of fundamental rights. In the end, President
Maisels rested his opinion on his value judgment of the scope of the fun-
damental right under question.3 7
Several opinions reveal that a consensus does not yet exist as to
whose values are to be taken into account. The widespread use of inter-
national sources and the repeated statements calling for joining the ranks
of civilized nations indicate that many of the judges of the opinions con-
sidered in this Article were willing to base their own normative
judgments in light of the trend as evidenced in civilized nations. Some
judges, however, were more reluctant, in their rhetoric at least, to favor
international sources and universal norms at the expense of national or
local value systems. A survey of several of these statements indicates,
however, that despite certain judges' sensitivities to taking particular or
national value systems into account, these judges still embraced univer-
sal values because such universal values were gaining acceptance at the
national level.
For example, in the Namibian Supreme Court's decision outlawing
corporal punishment, Justice Mahomed cited to the Zimbabwean case on
the legality of corporal punishment under the Zimbabwean Constitution
for its statement on the necessity of rendering a value judgment in the
area. He then stressed the importance of taking national norms into con-
sideration in this process, "regard being had to the contemporary norms,
aspirations, expectations and sensitivities of the Namibian people as ex-
305. Petrus v. State, [1984] BLR 14, 43 (Bots. Ct. App.).
306. Id. at 44.
307. See supra note 161.
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pressed in its national institutions and its Constitution .... ",308 Yet regard
for such national norms, in Justice Mahomed's view, entails "further
having regard to the emerging consensus of values in the civilised inter-
national community (of which Namibia is a part) which Namibians
share."3°9 This passage indicates how universal norms have been trans-
planted, in the view of this Justice, into his country's national value
structure, given its aspirations for joining the comity of civilized nations.
The Constitutional Court of South Africa must balance between fol-
lowing its constitutional mandate to refer to international law in
determining rights under the South African Constitution and grounding
its decisions in a context unique to South Africans." ° Several concurring
opinions in State v. Makwanyane show their awareness of this tension.
Justice Madala, for example, noted the absence in the Court's opin-
ion of the consideration of "traditional African jurisprudence" and the
values inherent in this jurisprudence when determining the constitution-
ality of the death penalty.3 ' Such traditional African jurisprudence, in his
view, includes not only South African values, but also those of "Africa in
general. 312 Justice Sachs in his concurring opinion voiced a similar view
of the need to consider traditional African jurisprudence in determining
the scope of the South African Constitution.313 In Justice Sachs's opinion,
the South African Constitution mandates that the Constitutional Court
adopt the broadest possible vision in order to give meaning to its aspira-
tions of justice and equality.31' These provisions mandate "giving long
overdue recognition to African law and legal thinking as a source of le-
gal ideas, values and practice."3 5
Justice Mokgoro shares a similar view. In her concurrence in Mak-
wanyane, she expressed her view of the important role that "indigenous
South African values" can play in ensuring that the courts promote the
values as mandated in section 35 of the South African Constitution. 6 In
her view, section 35 "seems to acknowledge the paucity of home-grown
judicial precedent upholding human rights, which is not surprising
308. See Ex parte Attomey-Gen., Namib. (In re Corporal Punishment by Organs of the
State), (1992) 103 I.L.R. 81,93 (Namib.).
309. Id. at 93-94.
310. The South African Constitution encourages the Constitutional Court to take into
consideration the concept of ubuntu, the South African worldview, or conception of humanity.
For a discussion on the definition of ubuntu and its role in the South African Constitution, see
Yvonne Mokgoro, Ubuntu and the Law in South Africa, 4 BUFF. HUM. Rrs. L. REV. 15
(1998).
311. State v. Makwanyane, 1995 (3) SALR 391, 486 (CC) (Madala, J., concurring).
312. Id. at 487.
313. See id. at 516 (Sachs, J., concurring).
314. See id. at 514.
315. Id.
316. Id. at 498 (Mokgoro, J., concurring).
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considering the repressive nature of the past legal order."37 Given this
paucity, she contended, the Courts must look to international sources for
guidance. Nonetheless, she continued, "However, I am of the view that
our own (ideal) indigenous value systems are a premise from which we
need to proceed and are not wholly unrelated to our goal of a society
based on freedom and equality."
'3 8
Almost paradoxically, she then cited to a European Court of Human
Rights opinion that stresses the importance of taking the "moral consen-
sus of the community" into consideration so as to facilitate the
community's acceptance of a law.39 She continued, "[i]n interpreting the
Bill of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms ... an all-inclusive value sys-
tem, or common values in South Africa, can form a basis upon which to
develop a South African human rights jurisprudence, '"320 and then pro-
ceeded to examine the scope of the value of ubuntu'2' in South African
society. In conclusion, she found that ubuntu espouses notions of human
dignity, which would form an indigenous basis for the Constitutional
Court to find the death penalty unconstitutional 322
Throughout the opinions examined in this Section lies the funda-
mental tension between the progressive narrative of adopting universal
human rights norms and the redemptive exercise of grounding norms in
a localized expression. The extent of the debate between the human
rights universalists and the African rights particularists examined in Part
I suggests that African courts would exercise more caution and restraint
in embracing the internationalist discourse. Most of the cases examined
here go against this conclusion. However, the Zimbabwean decision in
Magaya raises the question of whether this decision augurs a new trend
of refraining from realizing international norms when they come in di-
rect conflict with traditional laws and practices.
317. Id. at 499.
318. Id.
319. See id. (quoting Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 4 EuR. H.R. REP. 149, 184 (1982)).
320. Id. at 500.
321. See supra note 310.
322. Makwanyane, 1995 (3) SALR at 503. In reaching this conclusion by surveying the
indigenous South African values behind the notion of ubuntu, however, Justice Mokgoro still
examines comparative jurisprudence on the concept of human dignity. In doing so, she con-
siders American and Hungarian jurisprudence, and makes references to human dignity in
international law, in the form of the preamble to the ICCPR. "In international law ... human
dignity is generally considered the fountain of all rights." Id. at 501. The point of this interna-
tional survey, however, like in the Namibian decision, is to draw the links between indigenous
values and international norms. "Central to this... is the need to revive the value of human
dignity in South Africa, and in turn re-define and recognise the right to and protection of hu-
man dignity as a right concomitant to life itself and inherent in all human beings...." Id. at
502.
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Perhaps the area of women's rights is particularly susceptible to such
relativist contextualization. Either the Magaya decision will prove to be
an anomaly or the increased application of human rights norms in Africa
will awaken the relativist sensitivities of the populace or the courts. If the
latter scenario prevails, then the internationalist agenda of the courts in
Ephrahim and Dow can be seen as strained eagerness to conform with
the status of international norms or a fleeting fancy. Alternatively, the
approaches adopted in these decisions could prove to be the sustainable
judicial project of these courts. Only future jurisprudence will decide,
against the backdrop of these decisions as precedent nonetheless.
CONCLUSION
The cases studied in this Article evidence a nascent African human
rights jurisprudence, significant for the novel ways in which the African
courts rely on international and comparative law to support their funda-
mental rights jurisprudence. Together, they highlight the potential for
African judiciaries to enforce the respect for international human rights
norms in their countries and engage in the debate of the scope of these
rights in the historical and cultural context in Africa.
African courts' use of international and comparative case law as per-
suasive authority in their jurisprudence challenges the framework in
which traditional scholars of international law and human rights in
Africa have foreseen the role of such international norms in the national
context. Part II's textual analysis demonstrates that the traditional model
of the status of international law in domestic courts does not account for
the actual ways in which international sources and comparative case law
have been used in African fundamental rights jurisprudence.323 Classic
dualism of common law systems should serve as a barrier to the invoca-
tion of international human rights norms in national courts in Africa. But
the courts studied here defy these constraints. Even though litigants be-
fore these courts plead their claims in terms of violations of fundamental
rights found in their national constitutions, the courts draw parallels to
international human rights norms, as expressed in treaties or statements
of principles, and the pronouncements of foreign courts regarding these
rights in order to determine the scope of their national constitutional
guarantees. Most striking is that the courts do so seamlessly, without
323. For an example of how constraining the traditional model of international law in
domestic courts can be when analyzing the practice of national courts in Africa, see generally
TSHOSA, supra note 21, at 259-79.
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noting or explaining the binding nature or level of persuasive authority
of these international and comparative sources.
The cases examined here also provide interesting insights into the
debate between the universality and cultural relativity of human rights
norms in the African context. That individuals initiate litigation to chal-
lenge violations of their civil rights and liberties supports the argument
for the existence of a core set of human rights, predominantly in the civil
and political realm, that is universal.324 The conflicting court rulings in
the realm of women's rights, however, reveal that African courts con-
tinue to struggle with the coexistence of traditional cultural norms and
human rights, drawing the line on a case-by-case basis.
African courts face the challenge of overcoming their colonial pasts
and finding their own voices in legitimating human rights and rendering
them more accessible at the national level. To be sure, progressive judi-
cial decisions do not necessarily produce direct improvements in the
protection and enforcement of human rights. Nevertheless, these courts
play a significant role in establishing a framework for the growth of an
indigenous human rights culture, even if such a framework is based upon
the universalized discourse of international human rights norms.
In the absence of domestic precedent, African courts have looked
beyond their borders for persuasive authority to determine the scope of
their constitutional rights guarantees. Indeed several of the opinions ex-
amined here reveal that African judges view their role as one of bringing
their own domestic fundamental rights jurisprudence in line with prevail-
ing international norms. Furthermore, that several judges articulate their
concern over the perceived activist nature of their process of adjudica-
tion indicates that the future of progressive fundamental rights
jurisprudence drawing upon international and comparative sources is not
guaranteed. However, by referencing international norms and preexisting
comparative jurisprudence, these courts help temper criticism that they
are merely legislating through judicial decision making.
To conclude that these cases evidence an emerging human rights ju-
risprudence in Africa might seem ambitious. The number of cases that
employ international and comparative sources in their fundamental rights
jurisprudence is admittedly small and the reasoning of the courts in these
decisions is insufficiently developed to deduce what drives this phe-
nomenon. Given the practical challenges facing lawyers and judges in
Africa, the future of this human rights jurisprudence is uncertain. The
better versed African lawyers are in international law and comparative
case law, the more frequently they will draw parallels between their na-
324. See Bonny Ibhawoh, Between Culture and Constitution: Evaluating the Cultural
Legitimacy of Human Rights in the African State, 22 HuM. RTS. Q. 838, 838-89 (2000).
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tional fundamental rights and international human rights norms. African
courts will therefore have further occasion to deliberate over the persua-
sive authority of these international sources in their national
jurisprudence. In addition, the more resources are invested in the publi-
cation and diffusion of African jurisprudence, the more likely African
court fundamental rights cases will form the foundation of national ju-
risprudence.
In bringing to light this sample of African fundamental rights juris-
prudence, this Article seeks to moderate the simplistic but dominant
image of the African State as a violator of human rights. By focusing on
the creative and progressive dialogue African courts have engaged in
with international and comparative law sources, this Article hopes to in-
crease the attention and respect that is due to these courts and identifies
African courts as participants in the current era of judicial dialogue and
global constitutionalism.
